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Behavioural Game Theory: Thinking, 
Learning and Teaching 
Colin F. Camerer, Teck-H1Ia H o and /1I;n K1Ian Chon:5 
Introduction 
Game theory is a mathematical system for analysing and predicting how 
humans behave in strategic situations. Standard equilibrium analyses assume 
that all players: (I) form beliefs based on an analysis of what others might do 
(strategic thinking); (2) choose the best response given those beliefs (optim-
ization); and (3) adjust best responses and beliefs until they are mutually 
consistent (equilibrium). 
It is widely accepted that not every player behaves rationally in complex 
situations, so assumptions (I ) and (2) are sometimes violated. For explain ing 
consumer choices and other decisions, rationality may still be an adequate 
approximat ion even if a modest percentage of players violate the theory. 
But game theory is different : the players' fates are intertwined . The presence 
of players who do not th ink strateg ically o r optimize, even if there are very 
few such players, can change wha t rational players should do. As a result, 
what a population of players is likely to do when some are not thinking 
stra tegically and optimizing can only be predicted by an analysis that uses 
the tools of (1)-(3) but accounts for bounded rationality as well, preferably 
in a precise way.' 
An alternative way to define the equilibrium condition (3) is that players 
are never surprised when the strategies of other players are revealed. Defined 
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this way, it seems unlikely that equilibrium (3) is reached instantaneously in 
one-shot games. Indeed, in the modern view, equilibrium should be thought 
of as the limiting outcome of an unspeci fi ed learning or evolutionary process 
that unfolds over time.2 In this view, equilibrium is the end of the story of 
how strategic thinking, optimization, and equilibration (or learning) work, 
not the beginning (one-shot) or the middle (equil ibration). 
This chapter has three goals. First we develop an index of bounded ration-
ality which measures players' steps of thinking and uses one parameter to 
specify how heterogeneous a population of players is. Coupled with best 
response, this index makes a unique stati stica l prediction of behaviour in 
anyone-shot game. Second, we develop a learning algorithm (called a self-
tuning EWA - experience-weighted a ttraction) to compute the path of equi-
libration. The algorithm generalizes both fictitious play and reinforcement 
models, and has shown greater empi rical predict ive power than those mod-
els in many games (adj usting for complexity, of course). Consequently, the 
self-tuning EWA can se rve as an empirica l device for findin g the behavioural 
resting point as a function of the initial conditions. Third , we show how the 
index of bounded rationality and the learning algorithm can be extended 
to understand repeated game behaviours such as reputation building and 
strategic teaching. The idea is to present new, procedurally-rational models 
inspired by data, in the spirit of Werner Guth's (for example, GUth, 2000) 
many, many contributions of a si milar kind. 
Our approach is gu ided by three styl istic principles: precision, general-
ity and empirica l discipline. The first two are standard deSiderata in game 
theory; the third is a cornerstone in experimental economics. 
Precisioll 
Because game theory predictions are sharp, it is not hard to spot likely 
deviations and counter-examples. Until recently, most of the experimental 
litera ture consisted of docu ment ing deviations (or successes) and presenting 
a simple model, usually specialized to the ga me at hand. The hard part is to 
distil the deviations into an alternative theory that is as precise as standard 
theory and can be applied widely. We favour specifications that use one or 
two free parameters to express crucial elements of behavioural flexib ili ty, 
because people are d ifferent . We also prefer to let data, rather than our 
intuition, specify parameter values 3 
Gellerality 
Much of the power of equilibrium analyses, and their widespread use, comes 
from the fact that the same principles can be applied to many different 
games, using the universal language of mathematics. Widespread use of the 
language creates a dialogue that sharpens theory and accumulates worldwide 
know-how. Behavioural models of games are also meant to be general, in 
the sense that the models can be applied to many games with minimal 
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customization . The insistence on generality is common in economics, but is 
not universal. Many researchers in psychology believe that behaviour is so 
context-specific that it is impossible to have a common theory that applies to 
all contexts. Our view is that we cannot know whether general theories fa il 
until they are app lied widely. Showing that customized models of different 
games fit well does not mean there isn't a general theory waiting to be 
discovered that is even better. 
It is noteworthy that, in the search for generality, the models we describe 
below typically fit dozens of different data sets, rather than just one or two. 
The number of subject periods us.ed when games are pooled is usually several 
thousand. This does not mean the results are conclusive or unshakeable. It 
just illustrates what we mean by a general model. The emphasis on explain-
ing many data sets with a single model is also mean t to create a higher 
standard for evaluating models of learning (and lim ited cognit ion as well). 
When an investiga tor reports only a single experiment and a learning model 
customized to explain those data, it is hard to take such models seriously 
until their generality has been explored by applying them to other games. 
E/Ilpirical disciplille 
Our approach is heavily disciplined by data. Because game theory is about 
people (and groups of people) thinking about what other people and groups 
will do, it is unlikely that pure logic alone will tell us what will happen. As 
the phys icist Murray Gell-Mann supposedly said, 'Think how hard physics 
would be if part icles could think.' It is even harder if we do not watch what 
' particles' do when interacting. Or, as Thomas Schelling (1960, p. 164) wrote, 
'One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce what understandings can 
be perceived in a nonzero-sum game of maneuver any more than one can 
prove, by purely formal deduction, that a part icular joke is bound to be funny.' 
Our insistence on empirical discipline is shared by others, past and present. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) thought that 'the empirical back-
ground of economic science is definitely inadequate ... it would have been 
absurd in physics to expect Kepler and Newton without Tycho Brahe, - and 
there is no reason to hope for an easier development in economics '. Fifty 
years later, Eric Van Damme (1999) had a similar thought: 
Without having a broad set of facts on which to theorize, there is a 
certain danger of spending too much time on models that are mathem-
atically elegant, yet have litt le connection to actual behavior. At present 
our empirical knowledge is inadequate and it is an interesting question 
why game theorists have not turned more frequently to psychologists 
for information about the learning and information processes used by 
humans. 
The data we use to inform theory are experimental. Laboratory environ-
ments provide crucial control of what players know, when they move, and 
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what their payoffs are, which is crucial because game-theoretic predictions are 
sensitive to these variables (see Crawford, 1997). As in other lab sciences, the 
idea is to use lab control to sort out which theories work well and which do not, 
then use them later to help understand patterns in naturally-occurring data. 
In this respect, behavioural game theory resembles data-driven fields such as 
labor economics or finance more than does analytical game theory. The large 
body of experimental data accumulated since the 1980s (and particularly over 
the late 1990s early 2000s; see Camerer, 2003) is a treasure trove that can be 
used to sort out which simple parametric models fit well. 
Wh ile the primary goal of behavioural game theory models is to make 
accura te predictions when equilibrium concepts do not, it can also circum-
vent two central problems in game theory: refinement and se lection. Because 
we replace the strict best-response (optimization) assumption with stochastic 
better-response, all possible paths are part of a (statistical) equilibrium. As 
a result, there is no need to apply subgame perfection or propose belief 
refinements (to update beliefs after zero-probability events where Bayes' rule 
is useless). Furthermore, with plausible parameter va lues, the thinking and 
learning models often solve the long-standing problem of selecting one 
of several. ash equilibria, in a statistical sense, because the models make 
a unimodal statistical prediction rather than predicting multiple modes. 
Therefore, while the thinking-steps model generalizes the concept of equi-
librium, it can also be //lore precise (in a statistical sense) when equilibrium 
is imprecise (see Lucas, 1986)· 
We shall make three remarks before proceeding. First, wh ile we do believe 
the thinking, learning and teaching models in this chapter do a good job of 
explaining some experimental regularity parsimoniously, many other mod-
els are actively being explored 5 The models in this chapter illustrate what 
most other models also strive to explain, and how they are evaluated. 
The second remark is that these behavioural models are shaped by data 
from game experiments, but are intended for eventual use in areas of eco-
nomics where game theory has been applied successfully. We shall return 
to a list of potential applications in the conclusion, but to whet the reader's 
appetite, here is a preview. Limited thinking models might be useful in 
explaining price bubbles, speculation and betting, competition neglect in 
business strategy, simplicity of incentive contracts, and persistence of nom-
inal shocks in macroeconomics. Learning might be helpful for explaining 
evolution of pricing, institutions and industry structure. Teach ing can be 
applied to repeated contracting, industrial organization, trust-building, and 
policy-makers setting inflation rates. 
Thethird remark isabout howto read this long chapter. Thesecond and third 
sections, on learning and teaching, are based on published research and an 
unpublished paper introducing the one-parameter self-tuning EW A approach. 
We chose some examples to highlight what the models do and how they com-
pare to other models, and also use this opportunity to comment briefly on 
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methodology. The first section, on the cognitive hierarchy thinking model, 
is newer. Our 2002 working paper has many additional results. A short paper 
(Camerer etal., 2003) reports some brief results . 
We put all three into one paper to show the ambitions and sweep ofbehavi-
oural game theory. It is no longer the case that game theory is a broad enterprise 
that has solved all the ha rd problems, and behavioural game theory has just 
nibbled at some minor anomalies, with no underlying theoretical principles. 
Formal behavioural models, sharply honed on data, have been proposed in all 
the central issues in non-cooperative game theory- Howwill people playa new 
game? How do they learn? Do they behave differently when they are playing 
against others repeatedly? A natural question is how the models of thinking, 
learning and teaching fit together. The short answer is that the learning model 
is a mathematical special case of teaching in which all players are adaptive 
rather than sophisticated . The thinking and teaching models are not designed 
to fit together, since the cognitive hierarchy model is designed to apply to 
one-shot games (where planning for futu re rounds does not matter) and teach-
ing is clearly for repeated games. One could presumably unify the models by 
mapping increasing steps of strategiC thinking into increasing degrees of soph-
istication, but we have not done so. Or calling the thinking steps 'rules' and 
allowing players to learn in the domain of rules is a way of unifying the two (for 
example, Stahl, 1996). Since the models are so parsimonious there is no great 
saving in degrees of freedom by unifying them, but it would be important, both 
scientifically and practically, to know if there is a close link. 
A cognitive hiera r<:h y thinking model a nd bounded 
rationa lity measure 
The cognitive hierarchy (CH) model is designed to predict behaviour in 
one-shot games and to provide initial conditions for models of learning. 
The model uses an iterative process which formalizes Selten's (1998, p. 421) 
intuition that ' the natural way of looking at game situations ... is not based 
on circular concepts, but rather on a step-by-step reasoning procedure' . 
We begin with notation. Strategies have numerical attractions that dete rm-
ine the probabilities of choosing different strategies through a logistic 
response function. For player i, there are 111, strategies (indexed by)) which 
have initial attractions denoted A~ (O). Denote i's jth strategy by S;, chosen 
strategies by i and other players (denoted - i) in period t as 5,(t) and 5_, (t), 
and player i's payoffs of choosing J, by 7T,(J,. 5_, (t)). 
A logit response rule is used to map attractions into probabilities: 
(8. 1) 
where A is the response sensitivity6 
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We model thinking by characterizing the number of steps of iterated 
thinking that subjects do, and their decision rules.' In the CH model some 
players, using zero steps of thinking, do not reason strategically at al l. (Think 
of these players as being fatigued, clueless, overwhelmed, uncooperative, or 
simply more willing to make a random guess in the first period of a game 
and learn from subsequent experience than to think hard before learning.) 
We assume that zero-step players randomize equally over all stra tegies. 
Players who do one step of thinking do reason strategically. What exactly 
do they do? We assume they are 'over-confident' - though they use one step, 
they believe others are all using zero steps. Proceeding inductively, players 
who use K steps think all others use zero to K - 1 steps. 
It is useful to ask why the number of steps of thinking might be lim-
ited. One answer comes from psychology. Steps of thinking strain 'working 
memory', where items are stored while being processed. Loosely speaking, 
working memory is a hard constraint. For example, most people can remem-
ber only about five to nine digits when shown a long list of digits (though 
there are reliable individual differences, correlated with reason ing abi li ty). 
The strategic question: ' If she thinks he anticipates what she will do what 
should she do?' is an example of a recursive 'embedded sentence' of the sort 
that is known to strain working memory and produce inference and recall 
mistakes.s 
Reasoning about others might also be limited, because players are not 
certain about other players' payoffs or degree of rationality. Why should 
players think others are rational? After all, adherence to optimization and 
instant equilibration is a matter of personal taste or skill. But whether other 
players do the same is a guess about the world (and iterating further, a guess 
about the contents of another player's brain or a firm's boardroom activity) . 
The key challenge in thinking steps models is pinning down the frequen-
cies of K-step thinkers, ((K). The constraint on working memory suggests 
that the relative fraction of K - 1 step thinkers doing one more step of think-
ing, ((K) / ((K - 1), should be declining in K. For example, suppose the relative 
proportions of Z-step thinkers and 3-step thinkers is proportional to 1/3, the 
relative proportions of S- and 6-step thinkers is proportional to 1/6, and in 
general (K) I(K - 1) ()( 11K. This ax iom turns out to imply that (K) has a 
Poisson distribution with mean and standard deviation T (the frequency of 
level K types is (K) = ,-;:K). Then T is an index of the degree of bounded 
rationality in the population. 
The Poisson distribution has three appealing properties: it has only one 
free parameter (T); since Poisson is discrete it generates 'spikes' in predicted 
distributions reflecting individual heterogeneity (other approaches do not9 ); 
and for sensible T values the frequency of step types is similar to the fre-
quencies estimated in earlier studies (see Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Ho et al. , 
1998; and lagel et al., 1999) . When we compare Poisson-constrained distri-
but ions (K) to a 7-parameter free distribution, with (0) . ( I) ..... ((7) each a 
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separate parameter, the Poisson distribution fits only about I per cent worse 
in log-likelihood terms in most data sets (see Camerer et al., 2002b), so it is 
a very close approximation to a freer distribution . 
Figure 8.1 shows four Poisson distributions with different,. values. Note 
that there are substantial frequencies of steps 0-3 for,. around one or two. 
There are also very few higher-step types, which is plausible if the limH on 
working memory has an upper bound. 
Modelling heterogeneity is important, because it allows the possibility that 
not every player is rational. The few studies that have looked carefully found 
fairly reliable individua l differences, because a subject's step level or decision 
rule is fa irly stable across games (Stahl and Wilson, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 
2001). Including heterogeneity can also improve lea rn ing models by start-
ing them off with enough persistent variation across people to match the 
variation seen among actual people. 
To make the CH model precise, assume players know the absolute frequen-
cies of players at lower levels from the Poisson distribution. But since they 
do not imagine higher-step types, there is missing probability. They must 
adjust their beliefs by allocating the missing probability in order to com-
pute sensible expected payoffs to gUide chOices. We assume players diVide 
the correct relative proportions of lower-step types by L.~:i ((c) so the adjusted 
frequencies maintain the same relative proportions but add up to one. 
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Given this assumption, players using K > 0 steps are assumed to compute 
expected payoffs g iven their adjusted beliefs, and use those attractions to 
determine choice probabilities accordi ng to 
. m_,. {K-I[ (c) ] } A~ (0 IK)= L7Ti (S;. 5~i) X L K I x P~i (1 lc) h~1 ,~O L~o (c) (8.2) 
where A:(O IK) and pi (1 Ie)) are the attraction of level K in Period 0, and the 
predicted chOice probabili ty of lower leve l c in Period 1. 
As a benchmark, we al so fit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), defined 
by: 
nI_i 
A: (O IK) = L 7Ti(S, . 5~i) x P~i (1) (8 .3) 
11= 1 
(8.4) 
When A goes to infinity, QRE converges to the Nash equilibrium. QRE is 
closely related to a thinking-steps model in which K-step types are 'sel f-
aware' and believe there are other K-step types, and T goes to infinity. 
Fitting the m od el 
As a first pass, the thinking-steps model was fitted to data from three studies 
in which players made decisions in matrix games once for each without 
feedback (a tota l of 2,558 subject-games) .lo Within each of the three data 
sets, a common A was used, and best-fitting 7 values were estimated, both 
sepa rately for each game and fixed across games (maximizing log likelihood) . 
Our working paper (Camerer et aI. , 2002b) contains many more games and 
more model comparisons. 
Table 8.1 reports 7 values for each game separately, common 7 and A from 
the thinking-steps model, and measures of fit for the thinking model and 
QRE - the log likel ihood (ll) (which can be used to compare models) and 
the mean of the squared deviations (MSD) between predicted and actual 
frequenc ies. 
QRE fits a little worse than the thinking model in all th ree data sets . II This 
is a hint that a se lf-awareness model is not necessaril y more accurate than 
one with extreme over-confidence. 
Estimated values of " are quite va riable in the Stahl and Wilson data, but 
fair ly consistent in the others.12 In the latter two sets of data, estimates are 
clustered around o ne and two, respectively. Imposing a common 7 across 
ga mes only reduces fit very slightly (even in the Stahl and Wilson games I3 ) . 
The fact that the cross-game estimates are the most consistent in the Costa-
Gomes et al. (2001) games, which have the most structural variat ion among 
them, is a lso encouraging. 
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Table 8.1 Estimates of thinking model T and fit statistics, three matrix game 
experiments 
Stall I alld Cooper alld Costa-Gomes 
Wilsoll (1995) Vall Huyck (2003) et al. (200 I ) 
Game-specific 'T estimates 
Game I 18.34 1.14 2.17 
Game 2 2.26 1.0~ 2.21 
Game 3 1.99 0.00 2.22 
Game 4 4.56 1.25 1.4~ 
Game 5 5.53 0.53 1.81 
Game 6 1.70 0.80 1.58 
Game 7 5.55 1.1 7 1.08 
Game 8 2.03 1.75 1.94 
Game 9 1.79 1.88 
Game 10 8.79 2.66 
Game 11 7.33 1.34 
Game 12 21.~6 2.30 
Game 13 2.36 
Common T 8.44 0.81 2.22 
Common A 9.06 190.58 15.76 
Fit statistics (t/lillkillg steps model) 
MSD (pooled) 0.0257 0.0135 0.0063 
LL (pooled) - 1115 -1739 -555 
Fit statistics (QRE) 
MSD (QRE) 0.0327 0.0269 0.0079 
LL (QRE) - 11 76 - 1838 -599 
Note: In Costa-Gomes t't at (2001 ) the games are labelled and 2b-2 x 2, 3a-2 x 2, 3b-2 x 2. -4b-3x 2. 
4c-3 x 2, Sb-3 x2, 8b-3 x2, 90--l x 2. 40-2 x 3. 4d-2 x 3, 6b-2 x 3, 7b-2 x 3 and 9b-2 x 4. 
Furthermore, wh ile the values of A we estimate are often qUite large, t he 
overall frequencies the model predicts are close to the data. That means that a 
near-best-response model with a mixture of thinking steps can fit a little better 
than a QRE model, which assumes stochastic response but has only one 'type'. 
The heterogeneity may therefore enable modellers to use best-response calcu-
lations and st ill make probabilistic predictions, which is enormously helpful 
analytically. The large estimated values of A also mean that A can be set to a 
large value, or simply assume best-response of K > I -step types, which is a big 
computational saving and fits almost as well (Camerer et al. 2002a). 
Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show how accura tely the CH and Nash models fit the 
data from the three matrix-game data sets. In each figure, the data points are 
separate strategies from each of the games. Figure 8.2 shows tha t the data and 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
'" <ii 0.5 
0 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0. 1 
0 
o 
"" t 
.... 
• • 
• .. • A • 
• • • • 
to • • • • • • 
• 
• • •• • • 
. 
• • • 
• 
.,. ~ ... 
A • 
..,.f . 
•• 
•• 
• 
::* t ~ .. • 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Thinking steps model (common t) 
• Stahl-Wilson data (3 x 3 symmetric) 
Cooper-Van Huyck data (2 x 2 asymmetric) 
• Costa-Gomes et at. (2 x 2- 4 x 2 asymmetric) 
Figure 8.2 Fit of thinking-steps model to th ree games (R2 = 0.84) 
12 
R2 = 0.49 
/ 
. / . 
/ . 
. / . 
./ . 
~ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
c 0.8 0 
'<3 
'6 
Q) 0.6 Ci 
E 
:> 0.4 ~ 
. " CJ 0.2 w 
0 
-0.2 
Data 
Figure 8.3 Nash equilibrium predictions versus data in three games 
129 
1 
130 Be/wvioura/ Gallle T/leory: T/lillkillg/Leamillg/Teacilillg 
fits are reasonably good, while Figure 8.3 shows that the :\fash predictions 
(which are often zero or 1, pure equilibria, are reasonably accurate, though 
not as close as the thinking-model predictions). Since T is consistently around 
1-2, the CH model wi th a single 7" could be an adequate approximation to 
first-period behaviour in many different games. To see how far the model can 
take us, we investigated it in two other classes of games - games with mixed 
equilibria, and binary entry games. The next section describes results from 
entry games (see the Appendix on page 163 for details on mixed games). 
Market entry gam es 
Consider binary entry games in which there is capacity c (expressed as a 
fraction of the number of entrants). Each of many entrants decides simul-
taneously whether to enter or not. If an entrant thinks that fewer than c per 
cent will enter, s/he will enter; if s/ he thinks more than [ per cent will enter, 
s/he stays out. 
There are three regularities in many experiments based on entry games 
such as this one (see Ochs, 1999; Seale and Rapoport, 2000; Camerer, 2003, 
ch. 7): (i) entry rates across different capacities c are closely correlated with 
entry rates predicted by (asymmetric) pure equilibria or symmetric mixed 
equilibria (that is, about [ per cent of the people enter when capacity is c); 
(ii) players slightly over-enter at low capacities and under-enter at high 
capacities; and (iii) many players use noisy cut-off rules in which they stay 
out for most capaci ties below some cut-off c and enter for most higher 
capacities. 
Let us apply the CH thinking model with best response. Step zero players 
enter half the time. This means that when c < 0.5, I-step thinkers stay out, 
and when c > 0.5 they enter. Players doing 2 steps of thinking believe the 
fraction of zero steppers is (0) / «((0) + ( I» = 1/ ( 1+ 7). Therefore, they enter 
only if c > 0.5 and c > °l~~" or when c < 0.5 and c> IO~5,. To make this 
more concrete, suppose T = 2. Then 2-step thinkers enter when c> 5/ 6 and 
1/ 6 < [ < 0.5 . What happens is that more steps of think ing 'iron out' steps 
in the function re lating [ to overall entry. In the example, I-step players 
are afraid to enter when c < 1/ 2. But when c is not too low (between 1/6 
and 0.5) the 2-step thinkers perceive room for entry because they believe 
the relative proportion of zero-steppers is 1/3 and those players enter half 
the time. Two-step thinkers stay out for capacities between 0.5 and 5/6, but 
they enter fo r c > 5/ 6 because they know ha lf of the (1 /3) zero-step types 
will randomly stay out, leaving room even though 1-step thinkers always 
enter. Higher steps of thinking smooth out steps in the entry function even 
further. 
The surprising experimental fact is that players can co-ordinate entry reas-
onably well , even in the first period. ('To a psychologist', Kahneman (1988) 
wrote, 'this looks like magic.') The thinking-steps model provides a poss ible 
explanation for this magic and can account for the other two regu larities for 
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reasonable T values. Figure 8.4 plots entry rates from the first block of two 
studies for a game similar to the one above (Sundal i et aI., 1995; Seale and 
Rapoport, 1999). ,<ote that the number of actual entries rises almost mono-
tonica lly with c, and entry is above capacity at low c and below capacity at 
high c. 
Figure 8.4 also shows the CH entry function N(all l.)(e) for. = 1.5 and 2. 
Both functions reproduce monotonicity and the over- and under-capacity 
effects. The thinking-steps models also produces approximate cut-off rule 
behaviour for all higher think ing steps except two. When T = 1.5, step 0 
types randomize, step 1 types enter for all c above 0 .5, step 3--4 types use cut-
off rules with one 'exception ', and levels 5 and above use strict cut-off rules. 
This mixture of random, cu t-off and near-cut-off ru les is roughly what is 
observed in the data when individual patterns of entry across c are measured 
(see, for example, Seale and Rapoport, 1999). 
The model can also be used to do some simple theory. For example, in 
Camerer et 01., 2002b (and Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003) we show that 
the entry function is monotonic (that is, N(all l.)(e) is increasing in c) if 
1 + 2. < e', or T < 1.25. (The same condition guarantees that the conditional 
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entry functions including only up to K-step players get increasingly close to 
the equilibrium entry as K rises.) 
Thinking steps and cognitive m easures 
Since the CH model is a cognitive model, it gives an account of some treat-
ment effects and shows how cognit ive measures, such as response t imes and 
information acquisition, can be correlated with chOices. 
Belie(-promptillg 
Some studies show that asking players for explicit beliefs about what others 
will do moves their choices, moving them closer to equilibrium (compared 
to a control in which beliefs are not prompted - see, for example, Costa-
Gomes and Weizsacker, 2003). A simple example reported in Wargl ien et al. 
(1998) is shown in Table 8.2. Best-responding I-step players thin k others are 
randomizing, so they will choose X , which pays 60, rather than Y, which 
has an expected payoff of 45. Higher-step players choose Y. 
Without belief-prompting, 70 per cent of the row players choose X. When 
subjects are prompted to articulate a belief about what the column players 
will do, 70 per cent choose the dominance-solvable equilibrium choice Y. 
Croson (2000) reports similar effects. In experiments on beauty contest 
games, we found that prompting beliefs also reduced dominance-violating 
choices modestly . Schotteretal. (1994) found a related display effect-showing 
a game in an extensive-form tree led to more subgame perfect choices. 
Belief-prompting can be interpreted as increasi ng all players' thinking by 
one step. To illustrate, assume that since step zeros are forced to articula te 
some belief, they move to step 1. Now they believe others are random so 
they choose X. Players previously using one or more steps now use two or 
more. They believe column players choose L so they choose Y. The fraction 
of X play is therefore because former zero-step thinkers now do one step 
of thinking. This is just one simple example, but the numbers match up 
reasonably weill' and it illustrates how belief-prompting effects could be 
accommodated within the thinking-steps model. 
Similarly, Cooper and Kagel (2003b) report that two-person teams play sig-
nalling games more strategically (and transfer learning better) than individu-
als (though see Kocher and Sutter, forthcom ing). This might be understood 
Table B.2 How belief-prompting promotes dominance-solvab le 
choices by row players 
Row move Co /umll pla)'er Without belief Witl, belief 
L R promptillg promptillg 
X 60,20 60,lO 0. 70 0.30 
Y 80,20 lO,lO 0.30 0 .70 
Source: W arglien et al. ( 1998 ). 
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formally in terms of a model in which the highest-step player ' teaches' the 
lower-step player. 
Inforlllation look-ups 
Camerer etal. (1993), Costa-Gomes etal . (2001), Johnson etal. (2002), and 
Salmon (2003) measure directly the information subjects acquire in a game 
by putting payoff information in boxes which must be clicked open using a 
computer mouse. The order in which boxes are opened, and for how long 
they are open, gives a 'subject's-eye view' of what players are looking at, 
and should be correlated with thinking steps. Indeed, Johnson etal. show 
that how much t ime players spend looking ahead to future 'pie sizes' in 
alternating-offer bargaining is correlated with the offers they make. Costa-
Gomes etal. show that look-up patterns are correlated with choices that 
result from various (unobserved) decision rules in normal-form games. These 
correlations means that a researcher who simply knew what a player had 
looked at could, to some extent, forecast that player's offer or choice. Both 
studies also showed that information look-up stat ist ics helped to answer 
questions that choices alone could not . IS 
Sum ma ry 
A simple cognitive hierarchy model of thinking steps attempts to predict 
choices in one-shot games and provide initial conditions for learning models. 
We propose a model which incorporate discrete steps of thinking, and the 
frequencies of players using different numbers of steps is Poisson-distributed 
with mean 7. We assume that players at level K > 0 cannot imagine players at 
their level or higher, but they understand the relative proportions of lower-
step players and normalize them to compute expected payoffs. Estimates 
from three experiments on matrix games show reasonable fits for T around 
1-2, and 7 is fairly regular across games in two of three data sets. Values of 
7 = I.S also fits data from fifteen games with mixed eqUilibria and reproduces 
key regularities from binary entry games. The thinking-steps model also 
creates natural heterogeneity across subjects. When best response is assumed, 
the model generally creates ' purification' in which most players at any step 
level use a pure strategy, but a mixture results because of the mixture of 
players using different numbers of steps. 
Learning 
By the mid-1990s, it was well-established that simple models of learning 
could explain some movements in choice over time in specific game and 
choice contexts. 16 Therefore, the issue is not whether simple models of learn-
ing can capture some aspects of movement in experimental data - that issue 
was well-settled (the answer is Yes) by the late 1990s. The bigger challenge 
taken up since then is to see how well a specific parametric model can 
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account for finer detai ls of the equilibration process in a ve ry wide ra nge of 
games. 
This section describes a one-parameter theory of learning in decisions 
and games called funct ional EWA (or self-tuning EWA for short; also called 
'functional EW A' or 'EWA lite' to emphasize its simple functions). Self-tuning 
EWA predicts the time path of individ ual behaviour in any normal-form 
game. Initial condi tions can be imposed or estimated in various ways. We use 
initial conditions from the thinking-steps model described in the previous 
section. The goal is to predict both initia l conditions and equilibration in 
new games in which behaviour has never been observed, with min imal free 
parameters (the model uses one parameter, A) . 
Param etric EWA learning: interpreta tion , uses and limits 
Self-tuning EWA is a relative of the parametriC model of learning called 
experience-weighted attraction (EWA) (Camerer and Ho, 1998, 1999). As in 
most theories, learning in EWA is characterized by changes in (u nobserved) 
att ractions based on experience. Attractions determine the probabilities 
of choosing di fferent strategies through a logistic response fu nction . For 
player i, there are Ill, strategies (indexed by j) which have initia l attractions 
denoted A:(O) . The thinking steps model is used to generate init ial attractions 
given parameter va lues T and A. 
To avoid complications with negative payoffs, we resca le payoffs by sub-
tracting by the minimum payoff so that rescale payoffs are always weakly 
positive. Define an indicator funct ion I(x. y) to be ze ro if x # y and one if 
x = y. The EWA attraction updating equation is : 
i </>N(t -l)A: (t - 1) + [0 + (1 - o)I(S,. 5,(t»]7T,(J,. 5_,(t» 
A/t) = N(t - 1)</>( 1 - p) + 1 (8.S) 
and the experience weight (the 'EW' pa rt) is updated according to N(t) = 
N( t - 1)</>(1 - p) + 1." Notice that the term [Ii + (1 - 0)1(J, . 5,(t»] implies that 
a weigh t of one is put on the payoff term when the strategy being reinforced 
is the one the player chose (J, = 5, (1» , but the weight on fo rgone payoffs 
from unchosen stra tegies (J, # s,(t» is Ii. (When forgone payoffs are not 
known exactly, averaging possible values or using historica l rules can be 
used as proxies. '8) Attractions are mapped into choice probabilities using a 
. ,o....l'11I 
logit response function l~ (t + 1) = f', (where.l. is the response sensi-
r.;'j,i AjU' 
tivity). The subscript i, superscript j, and argumen t t + 1 in J1 (t + 1) are 
reminders that the model aims to explain every choice by every subject in 
every period. '9 
In implementing the model, we shall typically take strategies to be stage-
game strategies. However, it is often likely that a strategy could be history-
dependent or have some other form, which should be considered in futu re 
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work. Furthermore, transfer of learning across games is an interesting topiC 
we have not explored (but see Cooper and Kagel, 2003a). 
Each EWA parameter has a natural interpretation. 
The parameter Il is the weight placed on forgone payoffs. Presumably it 
is affected by imagination (in psychological terms, the strength of coun-
terfactual reasoning or regret, or in economic terms, the weight placed on 
opportunity costs and benefits), or reliability of information about forgone 
payoffs (Heller and Sarin, 2000). 
The parameter <P decays previous attractions because of forgetting or, more 
interestingly, because agents are aware that the learning environment is 
changing and deliberately ' retire' old information (much as firms junk old 
equipment more quickly when technology changes rapidly). 
The parameter p controls the rate at which attractions grow. When p = 0, 
attractions are weighted averages and grow slowly; but when when p = 1 
attractions cumulate. We originally included this variable because some 
learning rules used cumulation and others used averaging. It is also a rough 
way to capture the distinction in machine learning between 'exploring' an 
environment (low p), and 'exploiting' what is known by locking in to a good 
strategy (high p) (see, for example, Sutton and Barto, 1998). 
rhe initial experience weight N(O) is like a strength of prior beliefs in 
models of Bayesian belief learning. (Imposing N(O ) < I - Q:I - PI guarantees that 
N(t) is increasing, which is sensible.) It plays a minimal empirical role, so it 
is set to N(O) = 1 in Qu r current work. 
[ WA is a hybrid of two Widely-studied models, reinforcement and belief 
lea rning. In reinforcement learning, on ly payoffs from chosen strategies are 
used to update attractions and gUide learning. In belief learning, players do 
not learn about which strategies work best; they learn about what others 
are likely to do, then use those updated beliefs to change their attractions 
and hence which strategies they choose (see Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and 
Levine, 1998). EWA shows that reinforcement and belief learning, which 
" 'e re often treated as being fundamentally different, are in fact related in a 
non-obvious way, because both are special kinds of reinforcement rules 2 0 
When Il = 0, the EWA rule is a simple reinforcement rule 2 1 When Il = 1 and 
p = 0, the EWA rule is equivalent to belief learning using weighted fictitious 
play22 
It is important to be very clear about what the EWA formulation means 
and does. First, one thing EWA suggests is that general learni ng can be 
thought of as a splice of two different cognitive processes: in one process, 
strategies that are chosen are automatically (and fully) reinforced; and in 
the other, players think about the forgone payoffs they would have gained 
from choosing other strategies and reinforce them less strongly (with weight 
0) . Many kinds of behaviour are now attributable to the behaviour of two 
kinds of system (see, for example, Kahneman, 2003): one system is very 
fast, automatic, pattern-orientated and somet imes subconscious (similar to 
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our perceptual system), and can work in parallel (for example, people can 
perceive sounds and images at the same time); the other is slow, deliberate, 
conscious, invokes abstract rules and cognition (logiC, arithmetic), and works 
se riall y. Put very roughly, is represents the strength of the second, more 
deliberative, process which generates counterfactual answers to the question 
'Could I have done better with another strategy?' Furthermore, seen in the 
dual-process light, reinforcement learning can be interpreted as suggesting 
that the second process does not start (which may be appropriate for animals 
with minimal cortical apparatus for deliberation, or for people under time 
pressure), while belief learning suggests that the second process completely 
overrides the rapid instinctive response of the first process. 
Second, EWA provides a way of checki ng whether a simple model is too 
simple. Obviously, every model is a simplification that permits cou nter-
examples. So making imperfect predictions is no reason to abandon a model. 
But imperfections are a reason to ask whether add ing features to a model 
can improve its predictions. EWA is one way of doing precise ly thi s. 
Forgone payoffs are the fuel that runs EWA learning. They also provide 
an indi rect link to 'direction learning' and imHation. In direction lea rning, 
players move in the direction of observed best response (Selten and StOcker, 
1986). Suppose players follow EW A but do not know forgone payoffs, and 
believe those payoffs are monotonically increasi ng between their choice Si(t) 
and the best response. If they also reinforce strategies near their choice Si(t) 
more strongly than strategies that are further away, their behaviour will look 
like direction lea rning. Imitating a player who is similar and successful can 
also be seen as a way of heuristically inferring high forgone payoffs from 
an observed choice and moving in the direction of those higher payoffs. 
However, this is probably not the whole story about 'observa tional learning', 
wh ich is a fruitful area of research (see, for example, Duffy and Feltovich, 
1999; Armantier, 2004).23 
The relationships of various lea rning rules can be shown visually in a cube 
showing configurations of parameter values (see Figure 8.S). Each point in 
the cube is a triple of EWA parameter va lues that specify a precise updating 
equation . The corner of the cube with <P = p = O. is = 1 is Cournot best-
response dynamics . The corner p = O. <b = is = 1, is standard fictitious play. 
The vertex connecting these corners, is = 1. P = 0, is the class of weighted 
fictitious play rules (see, for example, Fudenberg and Levine, 1998). The 
vertices with is = 0 and p = 0 or 1 are averaging and cumulative choice 
reinforcement rules. 
The biologist Francis Crick (1988) said, ' in nature a hybrid is often sterile, 
but in science the opposi te is usually true'. As Crick suggests, the point of 
EWA is not simply to show a surprising relationship among other models, but 
also to improve their fertil ity for explai ning patterns in data by combi ning 
the best modelling 'genes' . In reinforcement theories, received payoffs get the 
most we ight (in fact, all the weight24). Belief theories assume implicitly tha t 
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Note: The arrows indicate where the various learning models are, as special cases, 
in the EWA framework. The points represent empirical estimates for various games. 
Fig/lre 8.5 The EWA learning cube: learning models and empi rical estimates 
forgone and received payoffs are weighted equa lly. Rather than assuming 
that one of these intuitions about payoff weights is right and the other is 
wrong, EWA allows both intuitions to be true. When 0 < 8 < 1, received 
payoffs can gain more weight, but forgone payoffs also get some weight. 
The EW A model has been estimated by ourselves and many others on 
about 40 data sets (see Camerer et a/., 2002). The hybrid EWA model predicts 
more accurately in many cases than do the special cases of reinforcement 
and weighted fictitious play, except in games with mixed-strategy equilib-
rium, where reinforcement does equally well.25 It is extremely important to 
emphasize that, in our model estimation and valida tion, we a/ways penal-
ize the EWA model in ways that are known to generally make the adjllsted 
fit worse if a model is too complex (that is, if the data are in fact gener-
ated by a simpler model).26 Furthermore, econometric studies show that, 
if the data were genera ted by simpler belief or reinforcement models, then 
EWA estimates would generally correctly identify that fact for many games 
and reasonable sample sizes (see Cabra les and Garcia-Fontes, 2000; Salmon, 
2001 ), although Wilcox (2003) finds that heterogeneity in all model para-
meters lowers the estimate of 8 in mixed-equilibrium games (which may 
explain why low values of 8 often fit well in these games). Since EWA is 
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capable of identifying behaviour consistent with special cases, when it does 
not, then the hybrid parameter values are improving in fit. 
Figure 8.5 also shows estimated parameter triples from 20 data sets. Each 
point is an estimate from a different game. If one of the special case theor-
ies is a good approximation to how people generally behave across games, 
estimated parameters should cluster in the corner or vertex corresponding 
to that theory. In fact, parameters tend to be sprinkled around the cube, 
although many (typically mixed-equilibrium games) cluster in the averaged 
reinforcement corner with low Ii and p. The dispersion of estimates in the 
cube raises an important question: is there regularity in which games gener-
ate which parameter estimates? A positive answer to this question is crucial 
for predicting behaviour in brand new games. 
This concern is addressed by a version of EWA, self-tuning EWA, which 
replaces free parameters with deterministic functions cf>i(t).li i(t). Pi(t) of 
player i's experience up to period t. These functions determine parameter 
values for each player and period. The parameter values are then used in 
the EWA updating equation to determine attractions, which then determine 
choices probabilistically. Since the functions also vary across subjects and 
over time, they have the potential to inject heterogeneity and time-varying 
'rule learning', and to explain learning better than models with fixed para-
meter values across people and time. And since self-tuning EWA has only 
one parameter that must be estimated (,1),27 it is especially helpful when 
learning models are used as building blocks for more complex models that 
incorporate sophistication (some players think others learn) and teaching, 
as we discuss in the section below. 
The decay rate cf> is sometimes interpreted as forgetting, an interpretation 
carried over from reinforcement models of an imal learning. Certainly for-
getting does occur, but the more important variation in cf>i( t) across games is 
probably a player's perception of how quickly the learning environment is 
changing. The function <Pi( t ) should therefore 'detect change'. As in physical 
change detectors (for example, security systems or smoke alarms), the chal-
lenge is to detect change when it is really occurring, but not falsely mistake 
noise for change too often. 
The core of the <p,(t) change-detector function is a ' surprise index', which 
is the difference between other players ' recent strategies and their strategies 
in previous periods. To make exposition easier, we describe the function for 
games with pure-strategy equilibria (su itably modified for games with mixed 
equilibria, as noted below). First define a history vector, across the other 
players' strategies k, which records the historical frequencies (including the 
last period) of the choices by other players of S~i ' The vector element iI~(t) 
is ,~ , I">"'-'I ' H28 The recent 'history ' rt(t) is a vector of Os and Is which 
has a 1 for strategy s~, = S~i(t) and Os for all other strategies S~i (that is, 
rt( t) = l(s~i' s~,( t))). The surprise index Si(t) simply sums up the squared 
deviations between the cumulative history vector iI ~( t) and the immediate 
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recent history vector rt(t); that is, 5,(t) == L~~: (ll}(t) - rt(t»2. :-.iote that this 
surprise index varies from zero (when the last strategy the other player chose 
is the o ne they have always chosen before) to two (when the other player 
chose a particular strategy 'for ever' then suddenly switches to something 
brand new). The change-detecting decay rate is </>;(t) = 1 - 0.5· 5,(t). Because 
5, (1) is between zero and two, <b is always (weakly) between one and zero. 
The numerical boundary cases illuminate intuition: if the other player 
chooses the strategy s/he has always chosen before, then 5,(t) = 0 (player i 
is not surprised) and <b,(t) = 1 (player i does not decay the lagged attraction 
at all, since what other players did th roughout is informative). If the o ther 
player chooses a new strategy that was never chosen before in a very long 
run of history, 5,(t) = 2 and <I>,(t) = 0 (player i decays the lagged attraction 
complete ly and 'starts over'). :-.iote that, since the observed behaviour in 
period t is included in the history 1I~(t), </>;(t) will typically not dip to zero. 
for example, if a player chose the same strategy for each of nine periods and 
a new strategy in period 10, then 5,(t) = (0.9 - 0)2 - (1- 0.1)2 = 2·0.81 and 
<Pi( t) = 1 - 05(2·0.81) = 0. 19. 
In games with mixed equilibria (a nd no pure equilibria), a player should 
expect other players' strategies to vary. Therefore, if the game has a mixed 
equilibrium with W strategies that are played with positive probability (that 
is, W is the cardinality of the smallest support of any "ash strategy), the 
surprise index defines recent history over a window of the last W periods 
(for example, in a game with four strategies that are played in equ il ibrium, 
W = 4). Then rtU) = L~~: [ ,~ , 1\._ \:~S';.'i( ''' ]. 29 
A sensible property of 5,(t) is that the surprisingness of a new choice should 
depend not only on how often the new choice has been chosen before, 
but also on how variable previous choices have been. Incorporating this 
property reqUires <b to be larger when there is more dispersion in previous 
choices, which is guaranteed by squaring the deviations between current 
and previous history. (Summing absolute deviations between r,( t) and 1I,( t ), 
for example, would not have this property.) If previously observed relative 
frequencies of strategy k are denoted fi. , and the recent strategy is II , then the 
surprise index is (1 - flY + Lk=,,(tk - 0)2. Holding fI, constant, this index is 
minimized when all frequencies tk wi th k i' II are equal. In the equal-fi. case, 
the surprise index is 5,(t) = (111 _, - 1 )/ 111_, and <I>,(t) = (111 _, + 1 )/ 2111 _" which 
has a lower bound of 0.5 in games with large 111 _, (many strategies) . 
The opposite case is when an opponent has previously chosen a si ngle 
stra tegy in every period, and suddenly switches to a new strategy. In this 
case, <p,(t) is ~. This expression declines gracefully towards zero as the 
string of identical choices up to period t grows longer. (For t = 2. 3. 5 and 
10, the <b,(t) values are 0 .75, 0.56, 0.36, and 0.19. ) The fact that the <p values 
decline with t expresses the principle that a new choice is a bigger surprise 
(and should have an associated lower <1» if it fo llows a IOllger string of idelltical 
chOices that are different from the su rp rising new choice. It also embodies 
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the idea that dipping ",,( t ) too low is a mistake which should be avoided 
because it erases the history embodied in the lagged attraction. So "' ,( t) only 
dips low when opponents have been choosing one strategy reliably for a 
very long time, and then switch to a new one. 
Another interesting special case is when unique strategies have been played 
in every period up to t - 1, and another unique strategy is played in period t. 
(This is often true in games with large strategy spaces.) Then ",,(t) = 0.5 +-ii, 
which starts at 0.75 and asymptotes at 0.5 as t increases. 
The calculations above show that in the first few periods of a game, "',(t) 
will not dip much below 1 (because the tth period experience is included 
in the recent history ,,( t) vector as well as being part of the cumulative 
history " ,(t)) . But in these periods players often learn rapidly. Since it makes 
sense to start with a low value of "',(0) to express players' responsiveness 
in the first few periods, in the empirical implementation, we smooth the 
"',(t ) function by starting at <b,(O) = 0.5, and gently blending in the updated 
values according to ¢,(t) == 0.5 / t + (t - 1)<b,(t) j t. 
The other self-tuning EWA functions are less empirically important and 
interesting so we mention them on ly briefly. The function 8,(t) = "'i(t) / W. 
Dividing by W pushes 8i (t) towards zero in games with mixed equilibria, 
which matches estimates in many games (see Camerer et a/., 2003)30 Tying 
lii(t) to the change detector "' ,( t ) means that chosen strategies are reinforced 
relatively strongly (compared to unchosen ones) when change is rapid . This 
reflects a 'status quo bias' or 'freezing' response to danger (which is virtually 
universal across species, including humans). Since Pit t) controls how sharply 
subjects lock in to choosing a small number of strategies, we use a 'Gini 
coefficient' - a standard measure of dispersion often used to measure income 
inequality - over choice frequencies 3 1.32 
Self-tuning EWA has three advantages. First, it is easy to use because it 
has only one free parameter (A). Second, parameters in self-tuning EWA 
naturally vary across time and people (as well as across games), which can 
capture heterogeneity and mimic 'rule learning' in which parameters vary 
over time (see, for example, Stahl, 1996, 2000; Salmon, 2001). For example, 
if '" rises across periods from 0 to 1 as other players stabilize, players are 
effectively switching from Cournot-type dynamics to fictitious play. If 8 rises 
from 0 to 1, players are effectively switching from reinforcement to belief 
learning. Third, it should be easier to theorize about the limiting behaviour 
of self-tuning EWA than about some parametric models. A key feature of 
self-tuning EWA is that, as a player's opponent's behaviour stabilizes, <bitt) 
goes toward 1 and (in games with pure equilibria) 8,(t) does too. If P = 0, 
self-tuning EWA then automatically turns into fictiti ous play; and a lot is 
known about theoretical properties of fictitious play. 
Self-tun ing EW A p red ictions 
In this section we compare in-sample fit and out-of-sample predictive accur-
acy of different learning models when parameters are estimated freely, and 
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check whether self-tuning EWA functions can produce game-specific para-
meters similar to estimated values. We use seven games: games with unique 
mixed strategy equilibrium (Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1997); R&D (research 
and development) patent race games (Rapoport and Amaldoss, 2000); a 
median-action order statistic co-ordination game with several players (Van 
Huyck etal. , 1990); a continental-divide co-ordination game, in which con-
vergence behaviour is extremely sensitive to initial conditions (Van Huyck 
eta/. , 1997); a 'pots game' with ent ry into two markets of different sizes 
(Amaldoss and Ho, in preparation); dominance-solvable p-beau ty contests 
(Ho et a/., 1995); an d a price-matching game (called ' traveller's dilemma' by 
Capra etal ., 1999) . 
Estim atio n m ethod 
The estimation procedure for self-tuning EWA is sketched briefly here (see 
Ho et al., 2001 for details). Consider a game where N subjects play T rounds . 
For a given player i of CH step-level c, the likelihood function of observing 
a choice history of {si( I). si (2) . .. . . si(T - 1). si(T)} is given by: 
(S.6) 
The joint likelihood function L of observing all players' choices is given by: 
(S.7) 
where K is set to a multiple of T rounded to an integer. Most models are 
'burnt in ' by using first-period data to determine initia l attractions. We 
also compare all models with burnt-in attractions with a model in which 
the thinking steps model from the previous section is used to create initial 
conditions and combined with self-tuning EWA. :-.iote that the latter hybrid 
uses only two parameters (. and A) and does not use first-period data at all. 
Given the initial attractions and initial parameter values,]] attractions 
are updated using the EWA formula. Self-tuning EWA parameters are then 
updated according to the functions above and used in the EWA updating 
equation. Maximum likelihood estimation is used to find the best-fitting 
value of A (and other parameters, for th e other models) using data from 
the first 70 per cen t of the sub jects. Then the value of A is frozen and used 
to forecast behaviour of the entire path of the remain ing 30 per cent of 
the subjects. Payoffs were all converted to dollars (which is important for 
cross-game forecasting). 
In addition to self-tuning EWA (one parameter), we estimated the paramet-
ric EWA model (five parameters), a belief-based model (weighted fictitious 
play, two parameters) and the two -parameter reinforcement models with 
payoff variability (Erev eta/., 1999; Roth etal., 2000), and QRE. 
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Model fit and predictive accuracy in all games 
The first question we ask is how well models fit and predict on a game-
by-game basis (that is, parameters are estimated separately for each game) . 
Some authors fix a set of parameters for several games and see how well 
predict ions do based on those parameters. But it is impossible to know from 
such an exercise whether there is a better set of parameters, or how much 
the best-fitting parameters truly vary across games. By allowing parameter 
to vary across games we can both find out how well a single parameter 
would do (by looking at va riation across games - if variation is Iowa single 
parameter would be fine, or we can restrict the parameter to have a common 
va lue and see how badly the fit degrades), and have some gUidance as to 
which parameters fit best in which games. 
An alternative method is to simulate the entire path of play and compare 
some statistics of the simulated path with statistics of the data (e.g., Roth 
and Erev 1995). We have done this in several publications and do not d raw 
different conclusions from those drawn from the estimation method below 
(see, for example, Camerer etal., 1998; Camerer, Hsia and Ho, 2002; and 
Camerer, 2003, ch. 6). Furthermore, note that if the statistic that is used 
is the collditiollal relative frequency (that is, frequencies conditioned on all 
actual histories), it makes no d ifference whether the condi tioned histories 
are determined by the actual data, or paths are first Simulated, then the 
paths which match the data histories are selected for conditional-frequency 
com parison . The simulation method will give exactly the same resul ts as the 
method we use. Furthermore, if the frequencies that are compared are not 
conditioned on h istories, then the model can be doing poorly on capturing 
some kind of history-dependence but appear to fit well on the unconditioned 
frequencies.J • 
For out-of-sample validation we report both hit rates (the fract ion of most-
likely choices that are picked) and log likelihood (LL) . (Keep in mind that 
these results forecast a ho ldout sample of subjects after model parameters 
have been estimated on an earlier sample and then 'frozen'. If a complex 
model is fitting better withi n a sample purely because of spurious overfitt ing, 
it will in fact predict less well out of sample.) Results are summarized in 
Table 8.3. 
Across games, parametric EWA is as good as all other theories or better, 
judged by hit rate, and has the best LL in four games. Self-tuning EWA also 
does well on hit rate in six out of seven games. Reinforcement is competitive 
on hit rate in five games, and best in LL in two. Belief models are often 
inferior on hit rate and never best in LL. QRE clearly fi ts the worst. 
Combining self-tuning EWA wi th a thinking steps model to predict initial 
conditions (rather than using the firs t-period data), a two-parameter com-
binat ion is only a little worse in h it rate than self-tu ning EWA, and slightly 
worse in LL. 
TalJle 8.3 Out-of-sample accuracy of learning models 
Thillkillg stfWA EWA W()i.~htell lleill( Qllli 
+StIi W A fiet. play with PV 
(i" IIte %llil LL %H it LL %/-lit 1.1. IJ1d lit 1.1. IMl ll it LL %/-lit LL 
Con l ' l divide (7) 45 4H:1 47 - 470 47 - 460 25 - 565 45 - 557 5 - 806 
Med. aclion (14) 7 1 - 11 2 74 - 104 79 - 83 112 95 74 - 105 49 - 21:15 
p-llC ( I) 8 - 2 11 9 8 - 2 11 9 6 - 2042 7 - 2051 6 -2504 4 2497 
Pricing (0.1:1) 43 - 507 46 - 445 43 - 443 36 - 465 41 - 56 1 27 - 720 
Mixed games (2 1) 36 - 119 1 36 - 1382 36 - 131:1 7 34 1405 .n - 1392 35 - 1400 
Palents ( Ill) 64 - 1936 65 - 11:197 65 IR71l 51 - 2279 65 - 1864 40 29 14 
Pot games (SO) 70 - 43H 7() - 416 70 - 417 66 - 47 1 70 - 429 5 1 - 509 
Pooled 50 - 6986 51 - 6852 49 - 7 10() 40 -7915 46 -912S 36 - 9!r17 
KS r -Be 6 -309 3 -279 3 279 4 -344 - 346 
Nol l'';: S.lIlI plc ~ize~ are J 15, 1 flO, 5iRO, t 60, 960, 1700, 7]9, -1 674 (pook-d), 80; Thl' bes l fi ts for ~i'l('h gamC' and cr iter ion printed ill bold : h it 
ral t:''' 'i l ati 'i l ica lly indisti ngu ishahle frum th(' bl·~t (by thE' McNemar tesl ) also in bold. Nu mhcf'i in P <'lfC llthl'!)b after each game ntllll{' in co l. I 
arc hit rat\.':-. frulll a random model; cornp<lring h it f .:ltC'S in Ill(' ' (){, IIH ' columm i ndici.ltc~ how Illllch better the models (I re doing than ra ndom 
prediction . 
5011f(,: 110 (', nl. (2(XlI ). 
.... 
... 
w 
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The penultimate row of Table 8.3, ' pooled', shows results when a single set 
of common parameters is estimated for all games (except for game-specific 
A35 ) . If self-tuning EWi\. is capturing parameter differences across games 
effectively, it should predict especially accurately, compared to other models, 
when games are pooled. It does so: when all games are pooled, self-tuning 
EWi\. predicts out-of-sample better than other theories, by both statistical 
criteria. 
Some readers of our functional EWi\. paper were concerned that, by search-
ing across different specifications we may have overfitted the sample of seven 
games we reported. To check whether we did, we announced at conferences 
in 2001 that we would analyse all the data people sent us by the end of that 
year and report the results in a revised paper. Three samples were sent and we 
have analysed one so far - experiments by Kocher and Sutter (forthcoming) 
on p-beauty contest games played by individuals and groups. The KS results 
are reported in the last row of Table 8.3 (, KS p-BC). The game is the same 
as the beauty contests we studied (except for the interesting complication of 
group decision-making, which speeds equilibration), so it is not surpris ing 
that the results replicate the earlier find ings: belief and parametric EWi\. fit 
best by LL, followed by self-tuning EWi\. , and reinforcement and QRE mod-
els fit worst. This is a small piece of evidence that the solid performance of 
self-tuning EWi\. (while being worse than belief learning on these games) is 
not entirely caused by overfitting on our original seven-game sample. 
Now we shall show predicted and relative frequencies for three games 
that highlight differences among models. In other games the di fferences are 
minor or hard to see with the naked eye36 
Dominance-solvable games: beauty contests 
In beauty contest games, each of 11 players chooses X; E [0. 100J. The average 
of their choices is computed and whichever player is closest to p < 1 times the 
average wins a fixed prize (see Nagel , 1999, for a review). The unique Nash 
equilibrium is zero. (The games get their name from a passage in Keynes 
(1936) about how the stock market is like a specia l beauty contest in which 
people judge who others will think is beautiful.) These games are a useful 
way to measure the steps of iterated thinking players seem to use (since 
higher steps will lead to lower number choices) . Experiments have been run 
with exotic subject pools such as Ph.D.s and CEOs (Camerer, 1997), and 
in newspaper contests with very large samples (Nagel et a!. , 1999). The res-
ults are genera lly robust, although speCially-educated subjects (for example, 
professional game theorists) choose, not surprisingly, closer to equilibrium. 
We analyse experiments run by Ho eta!. (1998)37 The data and relat-
ive frequencies predicted by each learning model are shown in Figure 8.6. 
Figure 8.6(a) shows that while subjects start around the middle of the dis-
tribution , they converge steadily downwards towards zero. By Period 5, half 
the subjects chose numbers 1-10. 
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Figllre 8.6 Predicted frequencies for p-beauty contest 
The EWA, belief and thinking - self-tuning EWA model all capture the 
basic regularities although they underestimate the speed of convergence. 
(I n the next section we add sophistication - some subjects know that 
others are learning and 'shoot ahead' of the learners by choosing lower 
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numbers - which improves the fit substantially.) The QRE model is a dud in 
this game, and reinforcement also learns far too slowly because most players 
receive no reinforcement.'s 
Games with multiple equilibria : continenta l divide gam e 
Van Huyck etal. (1997) studied a co-ordination game with multiple equilibria 
and extreme sensitivity to initial conditions, which we call the continental 
divide game (CDG). The payoffs in the game are shown in Table 8 . .!. Subjects 
play in cohorts of seven people. Subjects choose an integer from 1 to 14, 
and their payoff depends on their own choice and on the median choice of 
all seven players. 
The payoff matrix is constructed so that there are two pure equilibria (at 
3 and 12) which are Pareto-ranked (12 is the better one). Best responses to 
different medians are in bold. The best-response correspondence bifurcates 
in the middle: if the median starts at 7 virtually any sort of learning dynamics 
will lead players toward the equilibrium at 3. If the median starts at 8 or 
above, however, learning will even tually converge to an equilibrium of 12. 
Both equilibrium payoffs are shown in bold italics. The payoff at 3 is about 
half as much as at 12, so which equilibrium is selected has a large economic 
impact. 
Figure 8 .7 shows empirical frequencies (pooling all subjects) and model 
predictions.39 The key features of the data are: bifurcation over time from 
choices in the middle of the range (5-10) to the ext remes, near the equilib-
ria at 3 and 12; and late-period choices are more clustered around 12 than 
around 3. There is also an extreme sensitivity to initial conditions (which is 
disguised by the aggregation across sessions in Figure 8.7(a»: namely, five 
groups had initial medians below 7 and all five converged toward the inef-
ficient low equilibrium. The other five groups had initial medians above 7 
and all five converged towards the effiCient high equilibrium. This path-
dependence shows the importance of a good theory of initial conditions 
(such as the thinking steps model ). Because a couple of steps of think-
ing generates a distribution concentrated in the midd le strategies 5-9, the 
thinking-steps models predicts that initial medians will sometimes be above 
the separatrix 7 and sometimes below. The model does not predict precisely 
which equilibrium will emerge, but it predicts that both high and low equi-
libria will sometimes emerge. 
~otice also that strategies 1-4 are never chosen in early periods, but are 
chosen frequent ly in later periods. Strategies 7-9 are chosen frequently in 
early periods but rarely chosen in later periods. Like a sportscar, a good 
model should be able to capture these effects by 'accelerating' low choices 
quickly (going from zero to frequent choices in a few periods) and 'braking' 
midrange chOices quickly (going from frequent choices to zero). 
QRE fits poorly because it predicts no movement (it is not a theory of 
learning, of course, but simply a static benchmark that is tougher to beat 
Tn"'l' 11.4 Pilyo ffs in 'continental divide' expe rimellt 
Choice 2 3 4 S 6 
I 4:; 49 52 55 S6 SS 
2 48 53 58 62 65 66 
3 48 54 60 66 70 74 
4 4:1 5 1 51l 65 71 77 
5 J5 44 52 60 69 77 
6 23 33 42 52 62 72 
7 7 IS 2H 40 S I 64 
S - 13 - I II 2J J 7 5 I 
9 J 7 24 - II 3 18 35 
10 - 65 -5 1 -37 - 2 1 - 4 IS 
11 - 97 -82 - 66 - 49 - .11 - 9 
12 - 133 11 7 - \00 - R2 - 6 1 - J7 
IJ - In - 156 - 137 - 11 8 - 96 - 69 
14 -Z 17 - 198 - 179 - 158 - 134 - lOS 
Notc: Hc~1 rl'plil' ~ ill bold. 
SOI lr((': VOl1 l1u yrk ('/ (1/ . ( 1997). 
Median cllUice 
7 S 9 10 
46 - S9 - ilK - 105 
6 1 - 27 :;2 67 
72 I - 20 - 32 
80 26 8 - 2 
83 46 32 2S 
H2 62 SJ 47 
78 75 69 66 
69 83 8 1 tlO 
57 88 89 9 1 
40 X9 94 98 
20 85 94 100 
-5 78 9 1 99 
- 33 67 8:1 94 
- 65 52 72 R5 
II 12 
- 11 7 - 127 
- 77 - 86 
- 41 - 48 
- 9 - 14 
19 IS 
41 41 
64 63 
HO flO 
92 94 
101 104 
IDS J 10 
-.06 112 
103 li D 
95 104 
13 
- IJ5 
- 92 
- 53 
19 
12 
39 
1\2 
II I 
96 
107 
11 4 
IIX 
11 7 
li Z 
14 
- 142 
- 9H 
51l 
- 22 
10 
3tl 
1\2 
82 
98 
I 10 
11 9 
123 
123 
IZO 
-.. 
" 
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(a) Empmcal frequency (bl SeIf-tlK'Ing EWA 
(c) ParametnC EWA (d) Belief-based 
(e) Choice reinforcement WIth PV (r) Quantal response 
Figllre 8.7 Predicted frequencies for continental divide 
than ~ash) . Reinforcement with PV fits well. Belief learning does not repro-
duce the asymmetry between sharp convergence to the high equilibrium 
and flatter frequencies around the low equilibrium. The reason why is dia-
gnostic of a subtle weakness in belief learning. Note from Table 8.4 that the 
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payoff gradients around the equilibria at 3 and 12 are exactly the same -
choosing one number too high or low 'costs' $0.02; choosing two numbers 
toO high or low costs SO.08, and so on. Since belief learning computes expec-
ted payoffs, and the logit rule means only differences in expected payoffs 
influence choice probability, the fact that the payoff gradients are the same 
means the spread of probability around the two equilibria must be the same. 
Self-tuning EWA, parametric EWA and the reinforcement models generate 
the asymmetry with low 0.0 
Ga mes with dominance-solvable equilibrium: 
price-matching with loyalty 
Capra etal. (1999) studied a dominance-solvable price-matching game. In 
their game, two players simultaneously choose a price between 80 and 200. 
Both players earn t he low price. In addition, the player who names the lower 
price receives a bonus of R and the players who names"the higher price pays 
a penalty R. (If the prices they choose are the same, the bonus and penalty 
cancel and players just earn the price they named.) You can think of R as 
a reduced-form expression of the benefits of customer loyalty and word-of-
mouth which accrue to the lower-priced player, and the penalty is the cost 
of customer disloyalty and switching away from the high-price firm. We like 
this game because price-matchi ng is a central feature of economic life. These 
experiments can also, in principle, be tied to field observations in future 
work. 
Their experiment used six groups of 9-12 subjects. The reward/penalty R 
had six values (5, 10,20, 25, 50, 80). Subjects were rematched randomly." l 
Figure 8.8 shows empirical frequencies and model fits fo r R = 50 (where 
the models differ most). A wide range of prices are named in the first round. 
Prices gradually fall, being 91-100 in Rounds 3-5, 81-90 in Rounds 5-6, and 
towards the equilibrium of 80 in later rounds. 
QRE predicts a spike at the Nash equil ibrium of 80.2 The belief-based 
model predicts the di rect ion of convergence, but overpredicts numbers in 
the interval 81-90 and underpredicts choices of precise ly 80. The problem is 
that the incentive in the traveller's dilemma is to undercut the other player's 
price by as little as possible. Players on ly choose 80 frequently in the last 
couple of periods; before those periods it pays to choose higher numbers . 
EWA models explain the sharp convergence in late periods by cumulating 
payoffs and estimating 0 = 0.63 (for self-tuning EWA). Players who chose 80 
while others named a higher price could have earned more by undercutting 
the other price, but weighting that higher forgone payoff by Ii means their 
chOice of 80 is reinforced more strongly, which matches the data. 
Reinforcement with payoff variability has a good h it rate because the 
highest spikes in the graph often correspond with spikes in the data. But the 
graph shows that predicted learning is much more sluggish than in the data 
(that is, the spikes are not h igh enough). Because q, = 1 and players are not 
I SO Behavioural Game Theory: ThillkillgiLeanlillg/feacilillg 
Figure 8 .8 Predicted frequency for traveller's dilemma (Reward = SO) 
predicted to move toward ex post best responses, the model cannot explain 
why players learn to choose 80 so rapidly. 
Economic value of learning models 
Since the 1980s, the concept of economic engineering has emerged as being 
increasingly important from its start in the late 1970s (see Plott, 1986). 
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Experimentation has played an important role in this emergence (see Plott, 
1997; Rassenti et al., 2001). For the practice of economic engineering, it is 
usefu l to have a measure of how much value a theory or design creates. For 
policy purposes, increases in allocative efficiency are a sensible measure, but 
for judging the private value of advice to a firm or consumer other measures 
are more appropriate. 
Camerer and Ho (2001) introduced a measure called 'economic value' . 
Schelling (1960, p. 98) wrote, 'a normative theory must produce strategies 
that are at least as good as what people can do without them'. Inspired by his 
definition, the economic value of a theory is how much model forecasts of 
behaviour of other players improve the profitability of a particular player's 
choices. This measure treats a theory as being like the advice service that 
professiona Issell (forexam pie, consul tan ts). Theval ueofa theoryisthed i fference 
in theeconomicvalueoftheclient'sdecisions with and without the advice. 
Besides being a businessperson's measure, economic value is a way of 
measuring the degree of disequilibrium in economic terms. Note that, in 
equilibrium, the economic value of a learning theory is zero or negative 
by definition (since players are already guessing perfectly accurately what 
o thers wil l do). A bad theory, which implicitly 'knows' less than the subjects 
themselves do about what other subjects are likely to do, wil l have negative 
economic va lue. 
Furthermore, do not conclude, mistakenly, that if a learning theory has 
economic value it does not describe how people in fact learn . The economic 
va lue assumes that an objective observer uses the theory to make a forecast 
and best-responds to it - in our terms below, such a person is 'sophistic-
ated' . So if the model describes accurately how adaptive players (who are 
/lot sophisticated) learn, it will have economic value. It is true, however, 
that a model of sophisticated players should not have economic value (since 
the advice it gives should already be known to the players, by definition of 
sophistication). 
To measure economic value, we use model parameters and a player's 
observed experience through period t to generate model predictions about 
what others will do in t + 1. These predictions are used to compute expected 
payoffs from strategies, and recommend a choice with the highest expected 
va lue. We then compare the profit from making that choice in t + 1 (given 
what other players did in t + 1) with profit from the target player's actual 
choice. Economic value is a good measure because it uses the full dist ribution 
of predictions about what other players are likely to do, a/ld the economic 
impact of those possible choices. These measures do not control for t he 
boomerang effect of how a recommended choice would have changed future 
behaviour by others, but this effect is small in most gamesH 
Data from six games are used to estimate model parameters and make 
recommendations in the seventh game, for each of the games separately. 
Table 8.5 shows the overall economic value - the percentage improvement 
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Table 8.5 Economic value of learning theories (percentage improvement in payoffs) 
Game self-tuning parametric Belief- Reinf.· QRE(%) 
EWA (%) EWA (%) based(%) PV(%) 
cont' \ divide 5.0 5.2 4.6 - 9.4 - 30.4 
median action I.S 1.5 1.2 1.3 -1.0 
p-Beauty contest 49.9 -to.8 26.7 - 7.2 - 63.5 
price matching 10.3 9.8 9.4 3A 2.7 
mixed strategies 7.5 3.0 1.1 5.8 -1.8 
patent race I.7 1.2 1.3 2.9 1.2 
pot games -2.7 -1.1 -1.3 - 1.9 9.9 
/\ 'ote: Highest economic value for each game is displayed in bold type. 
(or decline) in payoffs of subjects from following a model recommendation 
rather than their actual choices. The highest economic value for each game is 
printed in bold . Most models have positive economic va lue. The percentage 
improvement is small in some games because even clairvoyant advice would 
not raise profits much H 
Self-tuning EWA and EWA usually add the most value (except in pot 
games, where only QRE adds value). Belief learning has positive economic 
value in all but one game. Reinforcement learning adds the most value 
in patent races, but has negative economic value in three other games. 
(Reinforcement underestimates the rate of strategy change in continental 
divide and beauty contest games, and hence gives bad adv ice.) QRE has 
negative economic value in four games. 
Summary 
This section reports a comparison among several learning models on seven 
data sets. The new model is self-tun ing EWA, a va ri ant of the hybrid EWA 
model in which estimated parameters are replaced by functions en tirely 
determined by data. Self-tuning EWA captures a predictable cross-game vari-
ation in parameters and hence fits better than other models when common 
parameters are estimated across games. A closer look at the continental divide 
and price-matching games shows that belief models are close to the data on 
average but miss other featu res (the asymmetry in convergence toward each 
of the two pure equilibria in the continental divide game, and the sharp con-
vergence on the minimum price in price-matching). Reinforcement predicts 
well in co-ordination games and predicts the correct price often in price-
matching (but with too little probability). However, reinforcement predicts 
badly in beauty contest games. It is certainly true that for explaining some 
features of some games, the reinforcement and belief models are adequate. 
But self-tuning EWA is easier to estimate (it has one parameter instead of two) 
and explains subtler features other models sometimes miss . It is also never 
fits poor ly (relative to other games), which is the definition of robustness. 
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Sophistication and teaching 
The learning models discussed in the previous section are adaptive and 
backward-looking: Players only respond to their own previous payoffs and 
knowledge about what others did. While a reasonable approximation, these 
models leave out two key features: adapt ive players do not use information 
about other players' payoffs explicitly (though subjects in fact do<s); and 
adaptive models ignore the fact that when the same players are matched 
together repeatedly, their behaviour is often different than it is when they 
are not rematched together, generally in the direction of greater efficiency 
(see, for example, Van Huyck etal. , 1990; Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Clark 
and Sefton, 1999). 
In this section, adaptive models are extended to include sophistication 
and strategic teaching in repeated games (see Stahl, 1999; and Camerer et aI. , 
2002a, for details). Sophisticated players bel ieve that others are learning and 
anticipate how those others will change in deciding what to do. In learning 
to shoot at a moving target, for example, soldiers and fighter pilots learn to 
shoot ailead, towards where the target will be, rather than shoot at the target 
where it is when they aim. They become sophisticated. 
Sophisticated players who also have strategic foresight will 'teach ' - that 
is, they choose current actions which teach the learning players what to 
do, in a way that benefits the teacher in the long run. Teaching can either 
be mutually beneficial (trust-building in repeated games) or privately bene-
fi cial but socially costly (entry-deterrence in chain-store games). Note that 
sophisticated players will use information about the payoffs of others (to 
forecast what others will do), and will behave differently depending on how 
playe rs are matched, so adding sophistication can conceivably account for 
the effects of information and matching that adaptive models miss·6 
Sophistication 
Let us begin with myopic sophistication (no teaching). The model assumes 
a population mixture in which a fra ction a of players are sophisticated 
and 1 - a are adaptive. (It is possible to imagine a model with degrees of 
sophistication, as well , or learning to become sophisticated, as in Stahl, 
1999.) To allow for possible over-confidence, sophisticated players think 
that a fraction (1 - a' ) of players are adaptive and the remaining fraction 
n ' of players are sophisticated, like themselves· 7 Sophisticated players use 
the self-tuning EWA model to forecast what adaptive players will do, and 
choose strategies with high expected payoffs, given their forecast and their 
guess about what sophisticated players will do. Denoting chOice probabilities 
by adaptive and sophisticated players by p;(a. t) and P; (s. t), attractions for 
sophisticates are: 
m~l 
A;(s. t) = 2) n ' P~,(s. t + 1)+ (1 - (r' )p~, (a. t + 1) 1 X ",(i,. s~,) (8.8 ) 
k= 1 
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Note that, since the probability p' ,(5. t + 1) is derived from an analogous 
condition for A:(S. t), the system of equations is recursive. Self-awareness 
creates a wh irlpool of recursive thinking which means that QRE (and Nash 
equilibrium) are special cases in which all players are sophisticated and 
believe others are too (a = a ' = 1) . 
An alternative structure one could study links steps of sophistication to the 
steps of thinking used in the fi rst period. For example, define zero learning 
steps as using self-tuning EWA; one step is best-responding to zero-step 
learners; two steps is best-responding to chOices of one-step sophisticates, 
and so forth. We think th is model can produce results sim ilar to the recursive 
one we report below, and it replaces a and ,,' with T from the theory of 
initial conditions so reducing the entire thinking- learning-teaching model 
to just two parameters. 
We estimate the sophisticated EWA model using data from the p-beauty 
contests introduced above. Table 8.6 reports results and estimates of import-
ant parameters (with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses). For inex-
perienced subjects, adaptive EWA generates Cournot-Ii ke estimates (J, = 0 
and ii = 0.90). Adding sophistication increases J, and improves LL substan-
tially both in and out of sample. The estimated fraction of sophisticated 
players is 24 per cent and their estimated perception a' is zero (and is insig-
nificant), showing over-confidence (as in the thinking-steps estimates from 
the previous section)48 
Experienced subjects are those who playa second lO-period game with 
a differen t p parameter (the mul ti ple of the ave rage that creates the target 
Table 8.6 Sophisticated and adaptive learning model estimates for the p-beauty 
contest game 
ble.Yperiel1ced subjects Experiellced sllbiects 
Sophisticated Adapti,'" Sophisticated Adaptive 
EWA ElVA ElVA EWA 
1> 0_44 0.00 0.29 0.22 
(O.OS)" (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) 
8 0.78 0.90 0.67 0.99 
(0.08) (O.OS ) (0.05) (0.02) 
a- 0.24 0.00 0.77 0.00 
(O.Ool) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
a- 0 _00 0.00 0.41 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
LL 
In sample - 2095.32 -2155.09 - 1908_48 -2128.88 
Out of sample - 968 _24 -992 A 7 - 710_28 -925.09 
Note: ·S tandard errors in pa rentheses. 
Soufce: Camerer £'t al. (2002b). 
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number). Among experienced subjects, the estimated proportion of sophist-
icates increases to '" = 77 per cent. Their estimated perceptions also increase, 
but are still over-confident (a' = 41 per cent). The estimates reflect 'learning 
about learning': subjects who played one lO-period game came to realize that 
an adaptive process is occurring; and most of them anticipate that others 
are also learning when they play again . 
Strategic teaching 
Sophisticated players matched with the same players repeatedly often have 
an incentive to 'teach' adaptive players by choosing strategies with poor 
short-run payoffs that will change what adaptive players do, in a way that 
benefits the sophisticated player in the long run. Game theorists have shown 
that strategic teaching could select one of many repeated-game equilibria 
(teachers will teach the pattern that benefits them) and could give rise to 
reputation formation without the complicated apparatus of Bayesian updat-
ing of Harsanyi-style payoff types (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1989; Watson, 
1993; Watson and Battigali, 1997). This section of our chapter describes a 
parametric model which embodies these intuitions, and tests it with experi-
mental data. The goal is to show how the kinds of learning models described 
in the previous section can be extended parsimoniously to explain beha-
"iour in more complex games which are, perhaps, of even greater economic 
interest than games with random matching. 
Consider a finitely-repeated trust game, first studied by Camerer and 
\,Veigelt (1988). A borrower B wants to borrow money from each of a series 
of lenders denoted Li (i = 1. .... N). In each period a lender makes a single 
lending decision (Loan or No Loan). If the lender makes a loan, the borrower 
either repays or defaults. The next lender in the sequence, who observed all 
the previous history, then makes a lending decision. The payoffs used in the 
experiments are shown in Table 8.7. 
There are in fact two types of borrowers. As in post-Harsanyi game theory 
with incomplete information, types are expressed as differences in borrower 
payoffs which the borrowers know but the lenders do not (though the prob-
ability of a given borrower is each type is commonly known). The honest (Y) 
types in fact receive lIIore money from repaying the loan, an experimenter's way 
Table 8.7 Payoffs in the borrower- lender trust game 
Lelllier strategy 
l.oa n 
:\0 loan 
Borrower strategy 
Default 
Repay 
(No choice) 
Sourer: Camerer and W eigelt ( 1988). 
Pa),offs to lellder 
- 100 
~O 
10 
Payoffs to borrower 
Norlllal (X ) 
ISO 
60 
10 
HOliest (YI 
o 
60 
10 
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of inducing preferences like those of a person who has a socia l utility for being 
trustworthy (see Camerer, 2003, ch. 3 and references therein). The normal (X) 
types, however, earn 150 from defaulting and only 60 from repaying. If they 
were playing just once and wanted to earn the most money, they would default. 
In the standard game-theoretic account, paying back loans in finite games 
arises because there is a small percentage of honest types whoa/ways repay. This 
gives normal-type borrowers an incentive to repay until close to the end, when 
they begin to use mixed strategies and default with increasing probability. 
Whether people in fact play these sequential equilibria is important to 
investigate, for two reasons. First, the equilibria impose consistency between 
optimal behaviour by borrowers and lenders, and Bayesian updatingof types by 
lenders (based on their knowledge and anticipation of the borrowers' strategy 
mixtures); whether reasoning or learning can generate this consistency is an 
open behavioural question (see Selten, 1978). Second, the equilibria are very 
sensitive to the probability of honesty (if it is too low, the reputationa l equilib-
ria disappear and borrowers should always defau lt), and also make counterin-
tuitive comparative statics predictions that are not confirmed in experiments 
(for example, l\eral and Ochs, 1992; lung et a/ ., 1994) . 
In the experiments, subjects play many sequences of eight periods. The 
eight-period game is repeated to see whether equilibration occurs across 
many sequences of the entire game.49 Surprisingly, the earliest experiments 
showed that the pattern of lending, default and reactions to default across 
experimental periods within a sequence is roughly in line with the equi-
librium predictions. Typical patterns in the data are shown in Figure 8.9. 
Sequences are combined into ten-sequence blocks (denoted 'sequence') and 
average frequencies are reported from those blocks. Periods 1 . . . . . 8 denote 
periods in each sequer.ce. The figures show relative frequencies of 110 /oall and 
default (conditional on a loan). Figure 8.9(a) shows that, in early sequences, 
lenders start by making loans in early periods (that is, there is a low fre-
quency of no loan), but they rarely lend in periods 7-8. In later sequences 
they have learned always to lend in early periods and rarely in later periods. 
Figure B.9(b) shows that borrowers rarely default in earl)' periods, but usually 
default (conditional on getting a loan) in periods 7-B. The within-sequence 
pattern becomes sharper in later sequences. 
The general patterns predicted by equilibrium are therefore present in the 
data. But given thecomplexityoftheequilibrium, howdo players approximate 
it? Camerer and Weigelt (19RR) concluded their paper as follows: 
the long period of disequilibrium behavior early in these experiments 
raises the important question of how people learn to play complic-
ated games. The data could be fit to statistical learning models, though 
new experiments or new models might be needed to explain learning 
adequately. (pp. 27-B) 
The teaching model is a ' new model' of the sort Camerer and Weigelt had 
in mind. It is a boundedl)' rational model of reputation formation in which 
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(al Empmcal frequency IOf no loan ee) Predicted frequency 'Of 00 loan 
Figllre 8.9 Empirical and predicted frequencies for borrower-lender trust game 
the lenders learn whether to lend or not. They do not update borrowers' 
types and do not anticipate borrowers' future behaviour (as in equ ilibrium 
models); they just learn. 
In the teaching model, a proportion of borrowers are sophisticated and 
teach; the rest are adaptive and learn from experience but have no strategic 
fores ight. The teachers choose strategies that are expected (given their beliefs 
about how borrowers will react to their teaching) to give the highest long-run 
payoffs in the remaining periods. 
A sophistica ted teaching borrower's att ractions for sequence k after period 
t are specified as follows U E {repay. defalllt} is the borrower's set of strategies): 
X O /.Otlll .. 
A~(s. k. t) = 2:: 11 (a. k. t + 1) · 1TR(j . j') 
i'= Lo.m 
+ max 2:: 2:: P[(a.k. vli. _  J 
{ 
T J\ "o Lo.m 
Jr .... , l' = t + Zj' = LOdil 
1 S8 Beilavioural Gallle TileOl}': Tilillk illg/Learnillg/feacilillg 
The set 1'+1 speci fi es a possible path of future actions by the sophist_ 
icated borrower from round t + 1 until end of the game sequence. That 
is, 1,+, = {j,+ '·i' -2 .··· .iT- ,·iT} and i ,+ , = p o The expressions Pi. (a. k. uliu_,) 
are the overall probabilities of either getting a loan or not in the fu ture 
period u, which depends on what happened in the past (which the teacher 
anticipates).s' i{(s, k. t + 1) is derived from A~(s. k. t ) usi ng a logit rule. 
The updating equations for adaptive players are the same as those used 
in self-tuning EWAs, with two twists. First, since lenders who play in later 
periods know what has happened earlier in a sequence, we assume that 
they learnt from the experience they witnessed as though it had happened 
to them 52 Second, a lender who is about to make a decision in Period 
S of Sequence 17, for example, has two relevant sources of experience on 
which to draw - the behaviour seen in Periods 1-4 in Sequence 17, and 
the behaviour seen in the Period Ss of the previous sequences (1-16). Since 
both kinds of experience could influence the lender's current decision, we 
include both, using a two-step procedure. After Period 4 of Sequence 17, for 
example, attractions for lending and not lending are first updated, based 
on the Period 4 experience. Then attract ions are partially updated (using 
a degree of updating parameter a) based on the experience in Period S of 
the previous sequences53 The parameter a is a measure of the strength of 
'peripheral vision' - glancing back at the 'future' Period Ss from previous 
sequences to help guess what li es ahead. 
Of course, it is well known tha t repeated-game behaviour can arise in 
fin ite-horizon games when there are a small number of 'unusual ' types (who 
act as though the horizon is unlimited), which creates an incent ive fo r 
rational players to behave as if the horizon is unlimited until near the end 
(fo r example, Kreps and Wilson, 1982). But specifyi ng why some types are 
irrational, and how many there are, makes this interpretation difficu lt to 
test. In the teaching approach, which 'unusual' type the teacher pretends 
to be arises endogenously from the payoff structure: they are Stackelberg 
types, who play the strategy they would choose if they could commit to it. 
For example, in trust games, they would like to commit to repaying; but in 
entry-deterrence, they wou ld like to com mit to figh ting entry. 
The model is estimated using repeated game trust data from Camere r 
and Weigelt (1988) . In Ca merer etal . (2002a), we used parametric EWA to 
model behaviour in trust games. This model allows two different sets of 
EWA parameters for lenders and borrowers. In th is chapter we use self-
tuning EWA to model lenders and adaptive borrowers so the model has fewer 
parameters 5 4 Maximum likelihood esti mation is used to estimate parameters 
on 70 per cent of the sequences in each experimental session, then behaviour 
in the holdout sample of 30 per cent of the sequences is forecast using the 
estima ted parameters. 
As a benchmark alternative to the teaching model , we estimated an agen t-
based version of QRE sui table for extensive-form games (see McKelvey and 
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Palfrey, 1998) . Agent-based QRE is a good benchmark because it incorporates 
the key features of repeated-game equilibrium - strategic foresight, accur-
ate expectations about actions of other players, and Bayesian updating -
but assumes stochastic best- response. We use an agent-based fo rm in which 
players choose a distribution of strategies at each node, rather than using 
a distribution over all history-dependent strategies. We implement agent 
QRE (AQRE) with four parameters - different As for lenders, honest borrow-
ers and normal borrowers, and a fraction 8, the percen tage of players with 
normal-type payoffs who are thought to act as if they are honest (reflecting 
a 'homemade prior' wh ich can differ from the prior induced by the exper-
imental design55 ) . (Standard equi li brium concepts are a specia l case of this 
model when As are large and 8 = 0, and fit much worse than does AQRE). 
The implemention in our 2002 paper is itself a small contribution since it is 
quite complex to estimate AQRE in these games. 
The models are estimated separately on each of the eight sessions to gauge 
cross-session stability. Since pooling sessions yields similar fits and parameter 
values, we report on ly those pooled resu lts in Table 8.8 (excluding the A 
values). The interesting parameters for soph isticated borrowers are estimated 
to be 2r = 0.89 and u = 0.93, which means that most subjects are classified 
as teachers and they put a lot of weight on previous sequences. The teach-
ing model fits in-sample and predicts better out-of-sample than AQRE by a 
modest margin (and does better in six out of eight individual experimental 
sessions), predict ing about 75 per cent of the choices correctly. The AQRE fits 
reasonably well too (72 per cent correct) but the estimated 'homemade prio r' 
e is 0.91, which is absurdly high. (Earlier studies estimated numbers around 
0.1-0.2.) The model basically fits best by assuming that aI/ borrowers simply 
prefer to repay loans. This assumption fits most of the data but it mistakes 
Table B.B Model parameters and fit in repeated trust games 
Statistic Model 
Selftllllillg ElVA .,. AgelJt 
teac/lillg QRE 
In-sample Hit rate (%1 76.5% 73.9% 
Calibration (n = 5757) log-likelihood -2975 -3131 
Out-of-sample Hit rate (%1 75.8% 72.3% 
Validation (n = 289~ I log-likelihood -1468 - 1544 
Para"leters Estill/ates 
Cross-sequence learning a 0.93 
Percentage of teachers Ct 0.89 
Homemade prior p(honest) e 0.91 
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teach ing for a pure repayment preference. As a result, it does not predict the 
sharp upturn in defaults in Periods 7-8, which the teaching model doess6 
Figure 8.9(c)-(d) show average predicted probabilities from the teaching 
model for the no-loan and conditional default rates. No-loan frequencies 
are predicted to sta rt low and rise across periods, as they in fact do, though 
the model underpredicts the no-loan rate in general. The model predicts 
the increase in default rate across periods reasonably well, except for under-
predicting default in the last period. 
The teaching approach is a boundedly-rational alternative to type-based 
equilibriu m models of reputation formation S7 It has always seemed improb-
able that players are capable of the delicate balance of reasoning requ ired to 
implement the type-based models, unless they learn the equilibrium th rough 
some adaptive process. The teaching model is one parametric model of that 
adaptive process. It reta ins the core idea in the theory of repeated ga mes -
namely, strategiC foresight - and consequently respects the fact that match-
ing protocols matter. And since the key behavioural parameters (a and a) 
appear to be near 1, restricting attention to these va lues should make the 
model workable for doing theory. 
Summary 
In th is section we introduced the possibility that players can be sophistic-
ated - that is, they believe others are learning. (In future work, it would be 
interesting to link steps of iterated thinking, as in the first section, to steps 
of sophistica ted thinking.) Sophistication li nks learning theories to eq uilib-
rium ones if sophist icated players are self-aware. Adding sophistication also 
improves the fit of data from repea ted beauty-contest games. Interestingly, 
the proportion of estimated sophisticates is around a quarter when subjects 
are inexperienced, but ri ses to around three-quarters when they play an 
entire lO-period game for a second time, as if the subjects learn about learn-
ing. Sophistica ted players who know they will be rematched repeated ly may 
have an incentive to ' teach ', which provides a boundedly rational theory of 
reputation formation. We apply this model to data on repeated trust games. 
The model adds on ly two behavioural parameters, represen ting the fraction 
of teachers and how much 'peripheral vision' learners have (a nd some nuis-
ance A parameters), and predicts substan tially better than a quantal response 
version of equilibrium. 
Conclusion 
In the introduction we stated that the research programme in behavioural 
game theory has three goa ls: (i) to create a theory of one-shot or first-period 
play usi ng an index of bounded rationa lity measuring steps of thinking; (ii) 
to pred ict features of equil ibration paths when games are repeated; and (iii ) to 
explain why players behave differently when matched together repeatedlySS 
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The models described in this chapter illustrate ways to understand these 
three phenomena. There are many alternative models (especially of learn-
ing). The models described here are just some examples of the style in which 
ideas can be expressed, and how data are used to test and modify them. 
Keep in mind that the goal is /lot to list deviations from the Nash eqUi-
librium and stop there . Deviations are just hints. The goal is to develop 
alternative models which are preCise, general and disciplined by data - that 
is, some day game theory might be taught beginning with behavioural mod-
els and elldillg with analytical concepts such as equilibrium and its many 
refinements . All such models deserve to be ca lled 'game theory', except 
that these models are behavioural - rooted in psychological regu larity and 
sharpened by having to explain data - while analytical models are simply 
useful fictional answers to questions about how players of varying degrees 
of hypothetica l rationality behave. 
The thinking-steps model posits a Poisson distribution (with mean 7) of 
numbers of thinking steps, along with decision rules fo r what players using 
each number of steps will do . Studies with simple matrix games, beauty 
contests (unreported), mixed games, and entry games all show that values 
of T around 1.5 can fit data reasonably well (and never worse than the Nash 
equilibrium). The model is easy to use because players can be assumed to 
best-respond and the model usually makes realistic probabilistic predictions 
because the mixture of thinking steps types creates a population mixtu re 
of responses. The surprise is that the same model, which is tailor-made to 
produce spikes in dominance-solvable games, can also fit data from games 
with pure and mixed equilibria using roughly the same T. 
The second section compared several adaptive learning models. For 
explaining simple trends in equilibration, many of these models are close 
substitutes. However, it is useful to focus on where models fail if the goal 
is to improve them. The EWA hybrid was created to include the psycholo-
gical intuitions behind both reinforcement learning (received payoffs receive 
more weight than forgone payoffs) and belief learning (both types of payoff 
receive equa l weight). If both intuitions were compelling enough for people 
to lVa nt to compare them statistically, then a model that had both intuitions 
in it should be better still (and generally, it is). Self-tuning EWA uses one 
parameter (A) and substitutes functions for parameters. The major surprise 
he re is that functions such as the change-detector <Pi (t) can reproduce differ-
ences across games in which parameter values fit best. This means that the 
model can be applied to brand-new games (when coupled with a th inking-
steps theo ry of initial conditions) without having to make a prior judgement 
about which parameter values are reasonable, and without positing game-
specific strategies. The interaction of lea rning and game structure creates 
reasonable parameter va lues automatically. 
In the third section we extended the adaptive learning models to include 
sophisticated players who believe that others are learning. Sophistication 
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improves fit in the beauty contest game data. (Experienced subjects seem to 
have ' learned about learning' because the percentage of apparently sophist-
icated players is higher and convergence is faster.) Sophisticated players who 
realize they are matched with others repeatedly often have an incentive to 
' teach', as in the theory of repeated games. Adding two parameters to ada pt-
ive learning was used to model learning and teaching in finitely-repeated 
trust games. While trustworthy behaviour early in these games is known 
to be rationalizable by Bayesian - :'-lash mode ls with 'unusual ' types, the 
teaching model creates unusual types from scratch. Teaching also fi ts and 
predicts better than more forgiving quantal response forms of the Bayesian-
Nash type-based model. The surprise here is that the logic of mutual con-
sistency and type updating is not needed to produce accurate predictions in 
finite ly-repeated games with incomplete information. 
Potential applications 
A crucial question is whether behavioural game theory can help to explain 
naturally-occurring phenomena. We conclude the chapter with some spec-
ulations about the sorts of phenomena precise models of limited thinki ng, 
learning and teaching could illuminate. 
Bubbles 
Limited iterated thinking is potentially important because, as Keynes and 
many others have pointed out, it is not always optimal to behave rationally 
if you believe others are not. For example, prices of assets should equal their 
fundamental or intrinsic value if rationality is common knowledge (Tirole, 
1985). But when the belief that others might be irrational arises, bubbles can 
too. Besides historical examples such as Dutch tulip bulbs and the $S trillion 
tech-stock bubble in the 1990s, experiments have shown such bubbles even 
in environments in which the asset's fundamental value is controlled and 
common ly known s9 
Spewlatioll alld coll/petitioll Ileglect 
The 'Groucho Marx theorem' says that traders who are risk-averse should not 
speculate by trading with each other even if they have private information 
(since the only person who will trade with you may be better-informed). 
But this theorem rests on unrealistic assumptions of common knowledge of 
rationality and is violated constantly by massive speculative trading volume 
and other kinds of betting, as well as in experiments. 60 
Players who do limited iterated thinking, or believe others are not as smart 
as themselves, will neglect competition in business entry (see Camerer and 
Lovallo, 1999; Huberman and Rubinstein , 2000). Competition neglect may 
partly explain why the failure rate of new businesses is so high. Managerial 
hubris, over-confidence and self-serving biases correlated with costly delay 
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and labour strikes in the lab (Babcock et ai. , 1995) and in the field (Babcock 
and Loewenstein, 1997) can also be interpreted as players not believing that 
others always behave rationally. 
[lleelltives 
In a thorough review of empirica l evidence on incent ive contracts in organ-
izations, Prendergast (1999) notes that workers typically react to simple 
incentives, as standard models predict. However, firms do not usually imple-
ment complex contracts, which sliould elicit greater effort and improve effi-
ciency. Perhaps the firms' reluctance to bet on rational responses by workers 
is e"idence of limited iterated t h inking . 
• \ [llcroecOIIOIII ies 
\Voodford (2001) notes that in Phelps-Lucas 'islanCls' models, nominal 
shocks can have real effects, but their predicted persistence is too short 
compared to effects in data. He shows that imperfect information about 
Ilig ller-order nominal gross domestic product (GOP) estimates - beliefs about 
beliefs, and higher-order iterations - can cause longer persistence which 
matches the data. However, Svensson (2001 ) notes that iterated beliefs are 
probably constrained by computa tional capaCi ty. If people have a projection 
bias, their beliefs about what others believe will be too much like their own, 
which undermines Woodford's case. On the other hand, in the thinking-
steps model, players' beliefs are not mutually consistent so there is higher-
order belief inconsistency which can explain longer persistence. In either 
case, knowing precisely how iterated beliefs work could help to inform a 
central issue in macroeconomics - persistence of t he real effects of nominal 
shocks. 
Leafllillg 
Other phenomena are evidence of a process of equilibrat ion or learning. For 
example, institutions for matching medical residents and medical schools, 
and analogous matching in college sororities and college bowl games, 
developed over decades and often 'unravel' so that high-quality matches 
occur before some agreed-upon date (Roth and Xing, 1994). Bidders in eBay 
auctions learn to bid late to hide their information about an object 's com-
mon value (Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003). Consumers learn over time what 
products they like (Ho and Chong, 2003). Learning in financ ial markets 
can generate excess volatility and returns p redictability, which are otherwise 
anomalous in rationa l expectations models (Timmerman, 1993). We are cur-
rently studying evolution of products in a high-uncertainty environment 
(electronics equipment) for which thinking-steps and learning models are 
proving useful. 
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Teachillg 
Teaching in repeated games may prove to be the most potentially usefu l tool 
for economics, because it is essentially an account of how bounded rational-
ity can give rise to some features of repeated-game behaviour, where stand-
ard theory has been applied widely. The teaching model could be applied 
to repeated contracting, employment relationships, alliances among firms, 
industrial organization problems (such as pricing games among perennial 
rivals, and entry deterrence) and macroeconomic models of policy-maker 
inflation-setting. For example, the teaching model could be applied to the 
Kyd land - Prescott model of commitment in which the public learns about 
inflation from past history (using the self-tuning EWA rule described in the 
Appendix) and unemployment is determined by an expectational Phillips 
curve. Since policy-makers face a temptation to choose surprisingly high 
inflation to lower unemployment, they can either act myopically or ' teach ' 
the public to expect low inflation which is Pareto-opt imal in the long-run 
(see Sargent, 1999). A model similar to self-tuning EWA applied to hyperin-
flations is Marcet and Nicolini (2003). 
Appendix: thinking models applied to mixed ga mes 
and entry games 
Ga mes with mixed equilibria 
A good model of think ing steps should be able both to account for deviations from 
the l\ash equilibrium (as in the games above), alld reproduce the successes of the l\ash 
equilibrium. A domain in which the Nash equilibrium does a surprisingly good job 
is in games with unique mixed equilibria. It is hard to beat the Nash equilibrium in 
these games because (as we shall see) the correlation with data is in fact very good 
(around 0.9) so there is little room for improvement. Instead, the challenge is to see 
how well a thinking-steps model which bears little resemblance to the algebraic logic 
of equilibrium mi xi ng can approximate behaviour in these games. 
Ea rly tests in the 1960s and 1970s (mostly by psychologists) appeared to reject 
the Nash equilibrium as a descript ion of play in mixed games. As others have noted 
(for exa mple, Binmore et al., 2001), these experi ments were incomplete in important 
dimensions and hence inconclusi\'e. Financial incentives were very low o r absent; 
subjects typically did not play other human subjects (and often were deceived about 
playing other people, or were instructed only vaguely about how their computer 
oppone nts played); and pairs were often matched repeatedly so that (perceived) detec-
tion of temporal patterns permitted subjects to choose non -equilibrium strategies. 
Under conditions ideal for equilibration, however, convergence was rapid and sharp. 
Kaufman and Becker ( 196 1), for example, asked subjects to specify mixtures and told 
them that a computer program would then choose a mixture to minimize the sub-
jects' earnings. Subjects could maximize th eir possible ga ins by choosing the Nash 
mixture. After playing five games, more than half learned to do so. More recent exper-
iments are also surprisingly supportive of the. ash equilibrium (see Binmore et al., 
2001; Camerer, 2002, ch . 2). The data are supportive in two senses: (i) equ ilibrium 
predictions and actual frequencies are closely correlated, when taken as a whole (for 
example, strategies predicted to be more li kely are almost always played more often); 
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and (ii) it is hard to imagine any pa rsimonous theory that can explain the modest 
deviations. 
We applied a version of the thinking mode l in which K-step thinkers thin k all 
others are using K - I steps along with best response to see whether it could pro-
duce predict ions as accurate as Nash in games with mixed equilibria. Th is model is 
extremely easy to use (j ust start with step-zero mixtures and com pute best responses 
iteratively). Furthermore, it creates natural ' purification': players using different think-
ing steps usua lly choose pure strategies, but the Poisson distribution of steps generates 
a mixtu re of responses, and hence a probabilistic prediction. 
Model predictions are compared with data fro m fiheen ga mes wit h unique mixed 
equilibria, reported in Ca merer (2002, ch. 2)61 These games are not a random or 
exhaustive sample of recent resea rch but there are enough observations that we are 
confident the basic conclusion will be overturned by adding more studies. Note that 
we use data fro m all the periods of these games rather tha n the first period only. (In 
most cases, the first -period data are rarely reported, and there is usually little trend 
over time in the data.) 
Figure B.AI plots actua l frequencies on the ordinate (y) axis against either mixed-
strategy eq ui librium predictions or thinking-steps predictions on the abscissa (x) axis. 
Each data point in Figure B.A I represents a single strategy from a different game 
(pooling across all periods to reduce sampling error)6' 
In Figure B.AI , the value of T is common across games (1.46) and minim izes mea n 
squared deviations between predicted and actual frequencies. When values are estim-
ated separately for each game to mi nimize mean squared deviations, the values across 
the games (in the order they are listed above) are 0 .3, 0.3, 0.3, 2.2, 2.S, 0.1 , 1.B, 2 .3, 
2.9, 2.7, 0.5, O.B, 1.6, 1.5, 1.9. The lower values occur in games where the actual 
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mixtures are close to equal across strategies, so that a distribution with T = 0 fi ts well. 
When there are dominated strategies, which are usually rarely played, much higher T 
values are needed, since low 7 generates a lot of random play and frequent dominance 
violation. The simple arithmetical average across the fifteen games is 1.45, which is 
very close to the best-fitling common T = 1.46. Figure 8.A I shows two regul arit ies: 
both thinking-steps (Circles in the plot) and equilibrium predictions (triangles) have 
very high correlations (above 0.8) with the data, though there is substantial scatter, 
especially at high probabilities. (Keep in mind that sampling error means there is an 
upper bound on how well any model could fit - even the true model that generated 
the data.) The square root of the mean squared deviation is around 0.10 for both 
models. 
""·hile the thinking-steps model with common T is a little less accurate than the 
)Jash equilibrium (the game-specific model is more accurate), the key point is that 
the same model that ca n explain Nash deviat ions in dominance-solvable games and 
matrix games fits almost as well with a va lue of ,. close to those estimated in other 
ga mes. 
Table 8.A l shows a concrete exam ple of how the thinking model is able to approx-
imate mixture probabilit ies. The ga me is Mookerjhee and Sopher's (1997) 4 x ~ game. 
Payoffs are shown as wins (+) or losses (-) «2/3) - means a 2/ 3 chance of winning) 
in the upper left ce lls. The rightmost columns show the probabilities with which 
row players using different thinking steps choose each of the fou r row strategies. To 
narrate a little, zero-step players randomize (each is played with probability of 0.2S); 
one-step players best-respond to a random column choice and choose row strategy 3 
with probability of I, and so on. First notice that the weakly dominated strategy (~) is 
only chosen by a qua rter of zero-step players (s ince it is never the best response against 
players who randomize), which generates a small amount of choice that matches 
the data. )Jot ice also that the best responses tend to lurch around as thinking-steps 
cha nges. When these are ave raged over thinking-steps frequencies, a popu lation mix-
ture results. Furthe rmore, one of the quirkiest features of mixed equilibrium is that 
one player's mixture depends only on the other player's payoffs. This effect also 
occurs in the thinking steps model s, because a K-step row player's payoffs affect row's 
best responses, which then affect a K + I-step column player's best response. So one 
player's payoffs affect the oth er's strategies indirectly. Table 8.A 1 also shows the ~'fSE 
(mixed equilbrium) prediction, the data frequencies and overall frequencies from the 
thinking-steps model when,. = 2.2. The model fits the data more closely than MSE 
for row players (it accounts for underplay of row 2 strategy and overplay of strategy 
3) and is as accurate as MSE for column players. As noted in the text, the point is not 
that the thinking-steps model outpredicts MSE - it cannot, because MSE has such a 
high correlation - but simply that the model that explains behaviour in dominance-
solvable, matrix and entry games also generates mixtures of players playing near-pure 
strategies that are close to outcomes in mixed games. 
Market entry games 
Analysis of the simple entry game described in the text proceeds as follows. Step Os 
randomize so (0) / 2 level Os enter. Define the relative proportion of entry after 
accounting up through level k as N(k). Defme a Boolean function B(X) = 1 if X t rue, 
B(X) = 0 if X false. level I s enter iff 1/ 2 < C. Therefore, to tal entry 'after' l evel I types 
are accounted for is N(l) = f(0) / 2 + 8["'(0)/ «((0)/ 2) > clf\!). Total entry after level k 
type is therefore N(k) = (0) / 2 + 2:~~ 1 f(1I)B[N(II- I ) / (2::"~ 1 ((III)) > cl . A given c and 
T then generates a sequence of cu mulated entry rates wh ich asymptotes as k grows 
Tllb l" 8.1\ I Ilow thinking steps fits mi xed-glllllc data 
/iDlY Strategies 1-4 COIIIIIIII tllillkillS steps 0-5 
.\' Imtegit's 2 J 4 Step () \ 2 3 4 
\ + 0.25 0 0.5 \ 0 
2 + + 0.2S 0 0 0 \ 
3 + (2/ .1) I (2;:l )+ 0.25 I O.S 0 0 
4 ( 1/3)+ 0.25 0 0 0 0 
Sleps 
0 0.25 0. 25 0. 25 0. 25 
I 0.5 0.5 0 0 
2 1 () 0 0 
3 0 0 I 0 
4 0 0.5 0.5 0 
5 0.5 0.5 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 
7 0 0 I 0 
MSE 0.375 0.25 0.375 0 
Data 0.38 lUI n.27 0.04 
Thin king 0.46 0.23 0. 28 O.n:l 
SOl/rce: Moukt..'ri lil'(· ami Sopher ( 1997) " x 4 gamc. 
MSE 
S 
0 0.375 
0 0.25 
I 0.375 
0 0 
Dllt(/ 
0.32 
0. 17 
O.4:l 
0.08 
'I'IlillkillS 
Mlldel 
0.37 
0. 14 
O.4G 
o.cn 
'" ..... 
168 Belraviollral Game Tlreory: Tllillkillg/Leamillg/feaclrillg 
large. Define a function N(aI/ IT)(c) as the overall rate of ent ry, given T, for various 
capacities of c. 
The data reported in the text come from experiments by Sundali et at. (1995) and 
Seale and Rapoport (2000). Their game is not precisely the same as the one analyzed 
because, in their ga me, entrants earn 1 + 2(e - e) (where e is the number of entrants) 
and non-entrants earn 1. They used twenty subjects with odd values of e(l. 3 .... 19). 
To compute entry rates reported in Figure 8.A I we averaged entry for adjacent (values 
(that is, averaging 1 and 3 yields a figure for c = 2 matching e = 0.1, averagi ng 3 
and 5 yields a figure fo r c = 4 corresponding to c = 0.2 and so on). Obviously, the 
analysis and data are not perfectly matched, but we conjecture that the thinking-steps 
model can still match data closely and reproduce the three experimen tal regularities 
described in the text; whether this is true is the subject of ongOing research. 
Notes 
Our models are related to important concepts such as rationalizability, which 
weakens the mutual consistency requirement, and behaviour o f finite automata. 
The difference is that we work with simple parametric forms and concen trate on 
fitting them to data. 
2 In his thesis proposing a concept of eq uilibrium, Nash himself suggested that 
equilibrium might arise from some 'mass action' that adapted over time. Taking 
up Kash's implicit suggestion, later analyses filled in details of where evolutionary 
dynamics lead (see Weibull , 1995; Mailath, 1998). 
3 While great triumphs of economic theory come from parameter-free models (for 
exam pl e, Nash equilibrium), relying on a small number of free parameters is more 
typical in economic modelling. For example, nothing in the theory of intertemporal 
choice pins a discount factor 8 to a specific value. But if a wide range of phenomena 
are consistent with a value such as 0.95 , for example. then as economists 'we are 
comfortable working with such a value despite the fact that it does not emerge 
from axioms or deeper pri nci pies. 
4 Lucas (1986) makes a similar point in macroeconomic models. Rational expect-
ations ofte n yield indeterminacy, whereas adaptive expectations pin down a 
dynamic path. Lucas writes: 'The issue involves a question concern ing ho\\o' collec-
tions of people behave in a specific situation. Economic theory does not resolve the 
question ... It is hard to see what can advance the discussion short of assembling a 
collection of people, putting them in the situation of interest, and observing what 
they do' (p. 5421 ). 
5 Quantal response equilibrium (QRE), a statistical generalization of Nash, almost 
always explains the direction of deviations from Nash and should replace Kash 
as the static benchmark to which other models are routinely compared. Stahl and 
Wilson (1995), Capra (1999) and Goeree and Holt (2003) have models of limited 
thinking in one-shot games which are similar to ours. Jeh;el (2002) proposes a 
concept of limited foresight in games in which analogy is used to truncate co mplex 
games. There are many learning models. Self-tuning EWA genera lizes some of them 
(though reinforcement with payoff va riability adjustment is different; see Erev 
etal., 1999). Other approaches include rule learning (Stahl, 1996,2000), and earlier 
artificial intelligence (AI) tools such as genetic algorithms or genetic programming 
to 'breed' rules (see Jehiel, forthcoming). Finally, there are no alternative models 
of strategic teaching that we know of but th is is an important area others should 
examine. 
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6 ~ote the timing convention - attractions are defined before a period of play; so 
the initial att ractions A:(O) determine choices in Period I, and so on . 
7 This concept was first studied by Stah l and Wilson (1995) and ~agel (1995), and 
later by Ho, etal. (1998). A 1993 working paper by Debra Holt that also pioneered 
this approach was published in 1999. See also Sonsino el al. (2000). 
8 Embedded sentences are those in which subject-object clauses are separated by 
o ther subj ect-ob ject clauses. A classic example is: 'The mouse that the cat that the 
dog chased bit ran away'. To answer the question 'Who got bitten?' the reader 
must keep in mind 'the mouse' while processing the fact that the cat was chased 
by the dog. Limited working memory leads to frequent mistakes in recalling th e 
contents of such sen tences or answering questio ns about them (Chri stiansen and 
Chater, 1999). This notation makes it easier: 'The mouse that (the cat that Ithe 
dog chased] bit) ran away'. 
9 A natural competitor to the thinking-steps model for explaining one-shot games 
is quantal respo nse equilibrium (QRE) (see McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998; 
Goeree and Holt, 1999a). Weiszacker (2003) suggests an a ymmetric version 
equivalent to a thinking-steps model in which one type' thinks o thers are more 
random than slhe is. :vIore cognitive alternatives are the theory of thinking trees 
of Capra (1999) a nd the theory of 'noisy introspection ' of Goeree and Holt (2004). 
In Capra 's model, players int rospect unti l their choices ma tch those of players 
whose choices they anticipate. In Goeree and Holt's theory, players use an iter-
ated quantal response function with a response sensiti\-ity parameter equal to 
A/ t" where /J is the discrete iteration step. When t is very large, thei r model cor-
responds to one in which all players do one-step and think o thers do zero. When 
1= 1 the model is QRE. All these models gene rate unimodal distributions so they 
need to be expanded to accom modate heterogeneity. Further work should try to 
distinguish different models, or investigate whether they are similar enough to 
be close modelling substitutes. 
10 The data are -i8 sub jects playing 12 sym metric 3 x 3 games (Stahl and Wilson, 
1995); 187 subj ects playing 8 2 x 2 asymmetriC matrix games (Cooper and Van 
Huyck, 2003); and 36 subjects playing 13 asymmetriC games rangi ng from 2 x 2 
to 4 x 2 (Costa-Gomes et a/ ., 200 I). 
11 While the common-. models have one more free parameter than QRE, any reas-
onable information criterion penalizi ng the LL would select the thinki ng model. 
12 When A is set to 100 the 7 estimates become very regular, around 2, which suggests 
that the variation in estimates is caused by poor identification in these games. 
13 The differences in LL across game-specific and common Tare 0.5, 49.1 and 9.4. 
These are marginally significant (apart from Cooper-Van Huyck). 
14 Take the over-confidence K - I model. The 70 per cent frequency of X choices 
without belief-prompting is consistent with this model if flO IT)/ 2 + (0 IT) = 0.70, 
which is satisfied most close ly when T = 0.55. If belief-prompting moves all think-
ing up one step, then the forme r zero-steppers will choose X and all o thers choose 
Y . When T = 0.55 the fraction of level zeros is 29 per cent, so this simple model 
predicts 29 per cent choice of X after belief-prompting, close to the 30 per cent 
that is observed. 
15 Information measures are crucial to resolving the question of whether offers that 
are close to equa l splits are equilibrium offers which refl ect fairness concerns, 
or reflect at limited look-ahead and heuristic reasoning. The answer is both (see 
Ca merer et a/. , 1993; Johnson et al., 2002). In the Costa-Gomes (2001) study, two 
different decision rules always led to the sa me choices in th ei r ga mes, but requ ired 
170 Beltavioural Gallle Tlteory: Tltillk illg/LeamillgJreacitillg 
different look-up patterns. The look-up data we re able therefore to classify players 
according to decision rules more conclusively than could choices alone. 
16 To name only a few examples, see Came rer (1987) in markets for risky assets 
(partial adjustment models); Smith et al. (1988) in finitely- lived asset markets 
(Walrasian excess demand); McAllister (I 99 1) in co-ord ination games (reinforce-
ment); Camerer and Weigelt (1993) in stochastically-lived assets (entrepreneurial 
stockpiling); Roth and Erev (1995) in bargaining and best-shot public goods games 
(reinforcement learning); Ho and Weigelt (1996) in ex tensive-form co-ordination 
games (reinforcement and belief learning); and Camerer and Cachon (1996) in 
co-ordination games (Cournot dynamics). 
17 The parameter p is different from the one used in ou r original paper and is 
equ iva lently called 'kappa' in our recent worki ng papers. 
18 We have also appli ed slight va riants of th e model to extensive-form centipede 
games (Ho et ai, 1999), extensive-form signalling games (Anderson and Camerer, 
2001); and bilateral call ma rkets with private values (Camerer el al., 2002). Adapt-
ing the model to extensive forms and incomplete information requ ires making 
very slight further assumptions, bu t the three studies we have done show that 
the sa me basic framework can be used successfully. In extensive-form games the 
model needs to estimate forgone payoffs for branches of the game tree that are 
not reached . In the papers listed above, we do this using histo rical information, 
some average of the minimum and maximum payoffs (in signall ing and centi-
pede games), or 'clairvoyance ' (the other player's stated conditional response to 
the unchosen path in the tree, in centipede games). Any of these assumptions 
fit equally well. In the bilateral call markets we 'spill over' reinforcement from 
one private value to neighbouring private values (this kind of generalization is 
assumed in belief learning), but the strength of spillove r depends on how close 
the private values are; see also Roth and Erev (1995). 
19 Other models aim to explain choices aggregated at some level. Of course, models 
of this sort can sometimes be useful. But our view is that a parsimonious model 
that can explain very fine-grained data can probably explain aggregated data well 
too, while the opposite may not be true, so the harder ch allenge is to ex plain 
fine-grained data. 
20 See also Cheung and Friedman, 1997, pp. 54-5; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, 
pp. 184-5; and Ed Hopkins, 2002. 
21 See Bush a nd Mosteller, 1955; Harley, 198 1; Cross, 1983; Arthur, 1991 ; McAllister, 
199 1; Roth and Erev, 1995; Erev and Roth, 1998. 
22 When updated fictitious play beliefs are used to update the expected payoffs of 
st rategies, precise ly the same updating is achieved by rein forcing all strategies 
by their payoffs (whether received or forgone). The beliefs themselves are an 
epiphenomeno n that disappear when the updating equation is written expected 
payoffs rather than beliefs. 
23 Weber (forthco ming) al so finds that players' choices change over time, as if they 
are learning, even with /10 feedback about what oth ers have done (that is, even 
when they choose stra tegies repeatedly with no feedback ). He suggests that players 
are using their own previous choices as a kind of pseudo-experience. 
24 Taken seriously, reinforcement models also predict that learning paths will look 
the same whether players know thei r full payoff matrix or not. This prediction 
is rejected in all the studies that have tested it - for example, Mookerjhee and 
Sopher, 1994; Rapoport and Erev, 1998; Van Huyck et aI., 2001. 
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25 In mixed games, no model improves much on the Nash equilibrium (and often 
does not improve on quantal response equilibrium at all, and parameter identi-
fication is poor; see Salmon, Zool ). 
26 Tvpically, we penalize in-sample likelihood functions usi ng the Akaike and 
Bayesian information criteria, which subtract a penalty of one, or 10g(II ), times the 
number of degrees of freedom from the maximized likelihood. More persuasively, 
we rely mostly on out-of-sample forecasts which will be less accurate if a more 
complex model simply appears to fit better because it overfits in sample. 
27 Note that, if your statistical ob jective is to maximize hit rate, A does not matter 
and so self-tuning EWA is a zero-parameter theory given initial conditions. 
28 '"ate that, if there is more than one other player, and the distinct choices by 
different other players matter to player i, then the vecto r is an 11 - I -dimensional 
matrix if there are II players. 
29 In a naturally-occurring application where the equi librium structure is not known 
to the modell er, it is easy to create some statistic that proxies for 11', such as the 
number of strategies that have been chosen more than 25 per cent of the time 
in the previous eight periods. Such a rule will often overestimate 11' in empirical 
application, biasing <I>,(t) upwards compared to the value created by knowing 
I V exactly. Since letting <1>,(t) dip too low, and discarding history irretrievably is 
a bigger mistake than keeping too much history, such an adjustment typically 
should not be a big mistake. 
30 If one is uncomfortable assuming subjects act as if they know lV, you can easily 
replace IV by some function of the variability of others' choices to proxy for w. 
31 Formally, p,(t) = 2 x (L~~lt;"'(t) x ~l where (,'(1) are ranked from the lowest 
to th e highest. 
32 In ou r recent work we have switched to a model in which 5 is I fo r strategies that 
are better (or equa lly good) responses to the current strategy, and zero fo r worse 
responses. This in fact fits a little worse than D,(t) = q,,(t) / W, but has a sensible 
in terpretation in terms of direction learning and dual-system dynamics. We also 
fix p = 0 in recent work, since allowing the flexib le p,(t) function adds little to fit. 
33 The initial parameter values are q,,(O) = ("~CO) = 0.5 and D,(O) = q,i(O) / W. These 
in itial values are averaged with period-specific values determined by the functions , 
weighting the initial value by t and the functional value by '~I . 
3~ For exa mple, suppose half the players choose ABABAB .. in a game, and half 
choose BABAB .... Then a model which says that A is chosen half the time will 
fit perfectly in every period, even though it does not predict the transition from 
A to R and vice versa accurately at all. 
35 The pa rameter A seems to vary reliably across games in ways that are not easily 
adjusted for by rescaling payoffs to common inflation-adjusted currency levels. 
36 :Vlore details are in Ho et 01., 2oo I, and correspond in g graphs for all games can be 
seen at http: //www.bschool.nus.edu.sg/ depart/ mk/fbacjk/ewalite/ewalite.htm. 
37 Subjects were 196 undergraduate students in computer science and engineering 
in Singapore. Each grou p played ten times together twice, with different values of 
p in the two 10-period sequences. (One sequence used p > I and is not included. ) 
We analyse a subsam ple of their data with p = 0.7 and 0.9, from groups of size 7. 
This subsample combines groups in a ' low experience' condition (the game is the 
first of two they play) and a 'high experience' condition (the game is the second 
of two, following a game with p > I). 
38 Reinforcement can be speeded up in such games by reinforcing unchosen 
st rategies in some way, as Roth and Erev (1995) did in market games, which is 
why EWA and belief learning do better. 
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39 Their expe riment used ten cohorts of seven subjects each, playing for fiftee n 
periods. At the end of each period subjects learned the median, and played again 
with the same group in a partner protocol. Payoffs were the amounts on the table, 
in pennies. 
40 At the high eq uilibrium, the payoffs are larger and so the difference between 
the received payoff and 0 times the foregone payoff will be larger than at the 
low equil ibrium. (Numerically, a player who chooses 3 when the median is 3 
earns SO.60 and has a fo rgone payoff from 2 or 4 of SO. 58 ,0. The corresponding 
figures for a player choosing 12 are S 1.12 and S1.10· 8. The differences in received 
and forgone payoffs around 12 and around 3 are the same when 0 = I, but the 
difference around 12 grows la rger as 0 falls (for example, for the self-tuning EWA 
estimate ~ = 0.69, the diffe rences are 50.20 and SO.36 for 3 and 12). Cu mulating 
payoffs rather than averaging them 'blows up' the difference and produces sharper 
convergence at the high equilibrium. 
41 They also had a session with R = 10 but in this session one subject sat out each 
round so we dropped it to avoid ma king an ad IIOC assumption about learni ng in 
this unusual design. Each subject played ten times (and played with a different R 
for five more rounds; we use only the fi rst ten rou nds). 
42 As A rises, the QRE equ ilibria move sharply from smearing probability through-
out the price range (for low A) to a sharp spike at the equilibrium (higher A). 
No intermediate A can explain the combination of ini t ial dispersion and sharp 
converge nce at the end so the best-fitting QRE model essentially makes the Nash 
pred iction. 
43 In beauty contests and co-ordinat ion games, payoffs depend on the mean or 
median of fairly large groups (7-9 except in 3-person entry games), so switch ing 
one subject's choice to the recommendation would probably not change the mea n 
or median and hence would not change future be haviour much. In other ga mes, 
players are usually pai red randomly so the boomerang effect again is muted. We 
are currently redoing the analysis to simply compare profits of players whose 
choices frequently matched the recommendat ion with those who rarely did . This 
controls for the boomerang effect and also for a Lucas critique effect in wh ich 
adopting recommendations would change the bei;laviour of others and hence 
the model parameters used to derive the recommendations. A more interesting 
correction is to run experiments in which one or more computerized subjects in 
fact use a learning model to make choices, and compare their performance with 
that of actual subjects. 
44 For example, in the cont inental divide game, ex-post opt imal payoffs would have 
been 892 (pennies per player) if players knew exactly what the median would be, 
and sub jects in fact earned 837. EWA and self-tuning EWA generate simulated 
profits of 879-882, wh ich is on ly an improvement of S per cent over 837, but 
is 80 per cent of the maximum possible improvement from actual payoffs to 
clairvoyant payoffs. 
4S Partow and Schotter (1993), :vtookerjee and Sopher (1994), Cachon and Camerer 
(1996). 
46 Sophistication may also have the potential to explain why players sometimes 
move in the opposite d irection to that pred icted by adaptive models (Rapoport, 
1999), and why measured beliefs do not match up well with those predicted by 
adaptive beHef lea rning models (l\yarko and Schotter, 2002). 
47 To truncate the belief h ierarchy, the sophisticated players believe that the other 
sophisticated players, like themselves, believe there are n ' sophisticates. 
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-18 The gap between apparent sophistication and perceived sophistication shows 
the empirical advantage of separating the two. Using likelihood ratio tests, we 
can clearly reject both the rational expectations restriction a = a' and the pure 
overconfidence restriction a' = 0, although the differences in log-likelihood are 
not large. 
-19 Borrower subjects do not play consecutive sequences, which removes their incent-
ive to repay in the eighth period of one sequence so they can get more loans in 
the first period of the next sequence. 
50 To economize on computing, we search only paths of future actions that always 
have default fo llowi ng repay because th e reverse behaviou r (repay following 
defau lt) genera tes a lower return. 
51 Fo rmally, i~~ (a.k.vl;v_ ') = j'i:"""(a.k.v - 11;,_,) I~' (a.k.vl(Loall. ; ,. _ , » + 
jJi'''' ''''' (a . k. v - 11;,_,) . I'f (a. k. vi (NoLoall. ; . _, ». 
52 This is ca lled 'observa tional learning' (see Duffy and Feltovich, 1999; Armentier, 
200-1). Without this assumption, the model lea rns far move slowly than do the 
lenders, so it is clear that they are learning from observing others. 
53 The idea is to create an 'interim' attraction for Round t. B',(a. k. I) , based on the 
attraction A~ (a. k. t - I ) and payoff from Round t, then incorporate experience in 
Round t + I from pre\~ous sequences, transfo rming 8',. (a. k. t) into a final attraction 
.-\ ~ (a. k. I). See Camerer et al. (2002) for details. 
5-1 We use four sepa rate As for honest borrowers, lenders, normal adaptive borrowers 
and teaching borrowers, an initial attraction for lending A(O), and the spillover 
parameter (T and teaching proportion a. 
55 See Camerer and Weigelt (1988); Palfrey and Rosenthal (1988); McKelvey and 
Palfrey (1992). 
S6 In our cu rrent extension of the Camerer el al. (2002) paper on strategiC teaching, 
we impose a value of 8 that was measured independent ly in a separate experiment 
on one-shot trust games. It is around 0.20, mu ch lower than the estimate of 0.9 1, 
and when this measured number is used instead of letting 8 be a free parameter, 
AQRE degrades rather badly. 
57 One direction we are pursuing is to find designs or tests that distinguish the 
teaching and equilibrium updating approaches. The sharpest test is to compare 
behaviour in games with types that are fixed across sequences with types that 
are 'refreshed' independently in each period within a sequence. The teaching 
approach predicts similar behaviour in these two designs, but type-updating 
approaches predict that reputation formation dissolves when types are refreshed. 
58 A fourth enterprise fits utility functions that reflect social preferences for fairness 
or equality. This important area is not discussed in this chapter. 
59 See Smith et al., 1988; Camerer and Weigelt, 1993; and Lei et al., 200 1. 
60 See Sonsino et al., 2000; Sovik, 2000. 
61 The studi es, in the order in which T estimates are reported below, are Malcolm 
and Lieberman (1965), O'Nei ll (1987), Rapoport and Boebel (1992), Bloomfield 
(1994), Ochs (1995, games with 9 and 4 payoffs), Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997), 
Rapoport and Almadoss (2000, r = 8,20), Binmore etal. (2001 ), Tang (2001, games 
3 and I), games I , 3, -I . Readers please let us know of published studies we have 
overlooked; we plan to include them in a later draft. 
62 In each game, data from those 11- l out of the II possible strategies with the most 
extreme predicted equilibrium probabilities are used to fit the models. Excluding 
the II th strategy reduces the dependence among data points, since all II frequen-
cies (and predictions) obviously add up to one. 
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